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Abstract
This thesis attempts to positively solve three problems in the foundations of logic. If logi-
cal connectives are defined by their introduction and elimination rules, then how might one
prohibit the construction of dysfunctional rules, i.e. rules which let us infer anything from
anything else? How might one be held accountable to the consequences of those logical
rules that they accept in an argument? And, how might one who, for whatever reason,
doubts those logical rules regularly taken for granted, be convinced to adopt deductive
‘best practices?’ A variety of positions in the foundations of logic are reviewed, but it
is found that each either fails to answer all questions together, or leads one to troubling
epistemic conclusions. This thesis attempts to draw broad lessons from those positions
otherwise found wanting, and then builds on the seemingly most plausible perspective;
namely, non-factualism. Particularly, it is argued that non-factualism fails to distinguish
between epistemic values and epistemic domains, and that the consequence of this dis-
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Discussions in the foundations of logic all, one way or another, must deal with issues
arising from two short papers: Lewis Carroll’s “What the Tortoise said to Achilles”, and
Arthur Prior’s “The Runabout Inference Ticket”. In the first, Achilles and the Tortoise
discuss the nature of entailment relations through the examination of a modus ponens
argument. Given that one accepts P and P → Q, would it ever be acceptable to refuse
to assent to Q? Must one infer Q whether they like it or not? In the second, a new and
problematic logical connective, Tonk, is introduced. It’s common to think that once one
has given suitable introduction and elimination rules for a logical connective, one has done
everything required to specify its meaning. Certainly, this is the way we often teach logic
to students. Tonk appears to ‘follow the rules’: it has such introduction and elimination
rules, and under certain conditions it can lead us to true conclusions; however, Tonk turns
out to allow us to infer anything from anything else, and so it’s not clear that the initial
rules gave it any sort of meaning at all. The lesson seems to be that one must accept
some restrictions on the sorts of definitions of connectives that are allowed, restrictions
that will have to be specified outside the formal logical system being developed. This,
of course, raises the questions: which principle should be invoked and for what reasons?
Before outlining the structure of the thesis, it will first be of benefit to give further detail
to these guiding issues.
Carroll’s Tortoise, playing the role of the skeptic by accepting both P and P → Q but
refusing to accept Q, leads Achilles to the conclusion that if he were to ever successfully
convince someone to accept Q on the basis of a modus ponens argument, he must get them
to accept the validity of modus ponens as a principle, which amounts to having the tortoise
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accept an additional true premise along with P and P → Q: (P ∧ (P → Q)) → Q.1 One
might see this as superfluous, but nonetheless, with this premise in hand surely someone
must be convinced of Q. Unfortunately, it is recognized that such an argumentative move
is inadequate for the hardened skeptic, who will note that acceptance of Q in this case
depends still on an application of modus ponens (and, we might notice, and-introduction).
Achilles might be tempted to try a similar manouvre again, getting the skeptic to assent
to another true principle, which he readily will do: [P ∧ (P → Q) ∧ (P ∧ (P → Q))]→ Q.
But of course, this forces an acceptance of Q, once again, only if one accepts an application
of modus ponens. We are obviously on road to an infinite regress.
Russell succinctly describes the problem by saying that logic is lacking “the notion of
therefore, which is quite different from the notion of implies, and holds between different
entities... In the first of these [notions], a proposition is actually asserted, whereas in the
second it is merely considered.”2 The idea here is that the two premises, P and P → Q,
function differently such that the ‘P,’ supposedly common between them, is to be read as
two different sorts of things. Much more, of course, can be said about Russell’s view, but
what can be taken away here is that any response to a skeptic of Carroll’s kind must make
use of some notion beyond truth—be it a more nuanced way of individuating propositions,
or a further concept of “therefore.” Some notion along these lines will surface at the end
of chapter two, and then again in chapter four.
We will see the challenge of Carroll’s skeptic throughout all of the thesis, but there
is one further thing to note now: what if Tortoise did not accept (P ∧ (P → Q)) → Q?
The story goes that Tortoise doubts this hypothetical, but the next assertion of modus
ponens quells this doubt. It is only when moving from this additional hypothetical to the
conclusion, Q, that the skepticism properly returns, and then repeats. In other words,
Tortoise assents to the use of modus ponens, but not to the epistemological “force” of
logic. One can easily see then where a far more disastrous doubt so enters: deny the
hypothetical outright. This amounts to a skepticism about modus ponens, or about, more
generally, certain logical rules. One might, for example, infer by a different set of logical




matter is needed. Call Carroll’s story, where the skeptic is interested in force, a type-2
skepticism; and this other more sweeping concern about ‘which rules are the right rules,’
type-1 skepticism.
In the case of Tonk, or more generally ‘bad connectives,’ it will be best to follow Prior’s
original construction of the issue. Say we want to know what the conjunction connective,
and, ‘means.’ Then given a set of introduction and elimination rules which show us the
formal application of the connective, we know the meaning “for there is simply nothing
more to knowing the meaning of ‘and’ than being able to perform these inferences.”3
Consequently, ‘and’ means just what is specified by:
1. From any pair of statements P and Q we can infer the statement formed by joining
P to Q by ‘and’
2. From any conjunctive statement P-and-Q we can infer P










Insofar as one was willing to go along with this understanding of meaning, everything
appears to be in place: ‘And,’ the logical connective, means just what it does by the
way it figures in our logical reasoning—that when we know (or accept) two propositions
then we can inferentially combine them to form some conjunction, and that we can infer
each conjunct when we know (or accept) the whole. Now, we might ask, ‘what was this




... and ‘Tonk’ Elimination:
P -tonk-Q
Q
With just these rules one should now be able to provide a semantic reading of the
connective: ‘Tonk’ means just what it does by the way it figures in our logical reason-
ing—that when we know (or accept) some proposition we can inferentially combine it with
3Prior (1960)
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another to form some ‘Tonk’-conjunctive (or “contonktive,” if one prefers), and that we
can always infer it’s latter proposition (in this case, Q). These rules, one might notice,
also match the disjunction introduction and conjunction elimination rules—rules we take
to be meaningful and largely unproblematic—and so, if there is a problem, then it will
not be with the rules individually. At this point, however, the problem does become quite
clear: if we infer according to Tonk, then anytime we believe anything, or take anything
to be a premise, then we can conclude anything. As noted previously, if one finds this
view of meaning regarding connectives plausible, then they must also adopt some further
meta-logical principle to guide their selection of the rules, or, otherwise, must find good
company with Tonk.
Considering the broad applications that these three issues raise, it would seem as
though all must be addressed if one hopes to present a foundation for logic, its use and
truths. Thus, I begin in chapter one by exploring a prominent account which attempts
just that.
Paul Boghossian, in his paper “Knowledge of Logic,” considers a range of views on
logical foundations—particularly, non-factualism, default-reasonable beliefs, and conven-
tionalism—but finds that each position suffers in some manner, and so in spite of its own
problems, concludes that we are forced to accept some version of conceptual role semantics
as the best option among a problematic bunch. Conceptual role semantics provides us
with a way of understanding connectives such that Tonk would properly be ruled out, but
it brings with it some important consequences which I will try to show might leave one
with a lingering ‘bad taste:’ the rejection of an epistemic principle, “the principle of the
universal accessibility of reasons,” and the startling conclusion that the type-1 skeptic can
not be answered. Subsequently, I will take it that the book must be re-opened on the
outstanding issues of other positions.
To that end, in Chapter 2 we will explore Bob Hale’s position, presented in his paper
“Basic Logical Knowledge,” as our exemplar of accounts that take our basic logical beliefs
to be “default reasonable.” I will attempt to show that this account, and a handful of
relevantly similar ones, must contend with a number of strong criticisms, some possibly
irredeemable. Of particular note is the problem of epistemic access: in attempt to answer
Carroll’s Tortoise, Hale finds that one must accept “a species of non-inferential intellectual
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recognition—which we may as well call rational insight”4 to ‘ground’ a logical argument.
What is the nature of this insight? What is it about entailment that we ‘recognize’?
From discussion of these issues, I attempt to draw out a number of conclusions (most
explicitly in section 2.4) which will motivate an entirely different approach; and so, Chapter
3 will discuss Hartry Field’s ‘non-factualist’ position which both involves a different route
to justification as well as a different grounding for logical semantics. I will try to show that
what non-factualism appears to strike upon correctly is emphasizing the methodological
application of logic to the world; but also, that Field’s position falls prey to an issue not
unlike that which Boghossian’s position faces.
Finally, I question in chapter four what amendments may be made, if any, to bolster
non-factualism. I will propose a distinction for Field’s notion of an evidential system which
will clarify both the non-factualist position itself as well as how one might go about address-
ing this thesis’ overarching problems. Here we will see a variety of points from throughout
the thesis raised, and particularly Russell’s distinction, once again, about assertion and
reference.
4Hale (2002), pg. 298
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Chapter 1
Rule-Circularity and Conceptual Role Semantics
The first section of this chapter introduces Boghossian’s conceptual role semantics and
two constraining principles which specify the relationship between conceptual roles and
our justification of our beliefs. In the following sections I show how Boghossian’s position
addresses our three main concerns, and especially, in section 1.3, I show the usefulness of
rule-circular argumentation. There is, however, one preliminary remark to make regarding
the relationship between rule-circular arguments and Boghossian’s argumentative path to
conceptual role semantics.
Boghossian finds that he is led to his position, not simply by its own merits, but rather
by the lack of any compelling alternative. Among his critical discussion of competing
views, he resuscitates the criticism of rule-circular argumentation—originally lodged at
Boghossian himself by Gilbert Harman—that “one’s warrant for a principle of logic cannot
consist in reasoning that employs that very principle.”1 Particularly, Boghossian finds that
empirical approaches to logic fundamentally depend on this sort of argumentation and so
claims that such approaches are ‘no real alternative’ so long as one cannot use rule-circular
justification.2
Subsequently, after all other options have been exhausted and Boghossian returns to
what he calls ‘the inferential’ approach, which does use rule-circular reasoning, he gives up
some of what makes conceptual role semantics more compelling than the empirical picture
1Boghossian (2000), pg. 232.
The original context comes from Boghossian (1996) and Harman (1996)
2See: Boghossian (2000), pg. 232-234 (“An Empirical Justification For Logic”)
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(precisely the ‘you too’ criticism that the logical empiricist needs rule-circular reasoning).
Just as he notes the fact that bans on philosophical and argumentative tools ‘go both
ways,’ it would seem that, at least to the limit of inconsistency, so does permission.3
Consequently, I propose (and will attempt to show in section 1.3) that the sort of rule-
circularity he defends can be seen as amenable to a variety of other positions; and this
is of particular importance because plausible strategies which deny any circularity at all
(rule-circular or otherwise) are limited in number. With that said, we may now turn our
attention to conceptual role semantics and Boghossian’s position on the justification of
logic.
3Boghossian’s particular remark on the matter...
“For if we are barred from supposing that reasoning using a given logical principle can recon-
struct an a priori warrant for that very principle, are we not equally barred from supposing
that it could reconstruct an empirical warrant for that principle?” (Boghossian (2000)), pg.
233)”
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1.1 Meaning As (Almost) Use
Conceptual role semantics is broadly the view that the meaning of some thing is given by
the ‘conceptual role’ it plays. This notion can be very expressively powerful—the meaning
of anything (action, proposition, word, thought occurrence, etc.) is to be given by the
conceptual role it plays for a perceiver of that thing—or quite limited in its scope—there
is a subset of phenomena which is best or partly explained (leaving open other meaning-
avenues) by the conceptual role it plays for one of either an agent perceiving or acting.
The historical details surrounding the origin of this theory are hazy, but it can at least be
attributed to the family of views regarding “meaning as use.”
This should feel in some sense familiar, as it is not too far off from the idea that
introduction and elimination rules provide meaning for connectives by specifying how we
can begin and end our inferences with them. ‘And’ means just the inferences possible, given
a set of statements, that form their conjunctions; and just the inferences possible, given a
set of conjunctions, that dissolve them into their respective conjuncts. It is not immediate
that any ‘intro/elim’ semantics will turn out to be of the conceptual role variety,4 but if one
begins with the idea that meaning tracks differences (or, possible differences) in thought,
then it is certainly clear that there must be a ‘role reading’ of introduction and elimination
rules so long as they properly individuate connectives. Otherwise, one becomes committed
to the idea that there are things that are properly differentiable from one another on the
basis of their conceptual role but that do not incur different thoughts in the differentiator.
In other words, one would be committed to the idea that ‘and’ and ‘or,’ are different
logical connectives to the extent that their introduction and elimination rules determine
what different inferences are possible, but that we should expect no difference in the actual
inferences, the thoughts or behaviour, of someone using ‘and’ and some other using ‘or.’
Of course, it is possible to conceive of such cases where one’s reasoning from some premise
to some conclusion might be aptly described by a variety of rules, but the contention here
is systematic.5
4For example, one may be more inclined to read such schematic rules as an instance of structural
semantics. See Peregrin (2008) or Peregrin (2017) for more details.
5And outside of just the logical realm, one might consider the case of frogs snapping at ambient black
dots, confusing them for flies. The conceptual role of flies is such that the frogs snap, expecting food;
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Boghossian makes his variation of the theory clear by noting that:
“Of all the inferences that ‘if, then’ can and does participate in, a specific
subset is responsible for fixing its meaning. Given that subset, ‘if, then’ means
that unique logical concept, if any, whose semantic value makes the inferences
in that subset truth-preserving.”6
There are two functioning parts to this: first, that the logical concept has a semantic
value, responsible for determining whether or not the rule is truth-preserving, apart from
the rule’s use by a person; and second, inferences which are not truth preserving do not
have their meaning fixed. There is also the important qualification, “if any,” which tells
us that we may infer by a rule (whether it’s called ‘if, then’ or ‘Tonk’) which does not have
any conceptual role at all. In other words, conceptual roles do not determine our actual
inferential behaviour, only the meaning of some of our behaviour.
These moves, however, afford Boghossian the opportunity to cash out entitlement in
a non-conventionalist manner. Through the principle, (L)—“if M is a genuinely meaning-
constituting rule for S, then S is entitled to infer according to M, independently of having
supplied an explicit justification for M”7—we can say that one is entitled to their inferences
in just those cases where their behaviour ‘lines-up’ with the logical concepts, the meaning-
ful conceptual roles. It should be noted that (L) is stated in a relative manner: “if M is a
genuinely meaning-constituting rule for S, then...”; despite the seemingly universal condi-
tion for meaning, the existence of a concept which makes an inference use truth-preserving,
Boghossian states the idea in this weaker form. Momentarily, we will see how ‘universality’
comes to play a part in Boghossian’s position and in addressing our main concerns.
As a final piece to the puzzle, we must find some way of moving from generally
being entitled to our inferences, to being justified in our particular inferences. For this,
and the conceptual role of the ambient dots is not sufficiently different, the phenomena is not sufficiently
differentiable, prompting the same behaviour—as if the flies and dots were the same thing. Of course,
flies and ambient black dots are far from the same sort of thing, but a conceptual role semantics would
imply this is precisely because the phenomena have different conceptual roles for us, which both entails
our behavioural differences to flies and dots, and our different thoughts and reasoning about flies and dots.




we require something more powerful than just (L), and this is where Boghossian believes
rule-circular argumentation will come into focus. Though I leave the full explanation of
this aspect to section 1.3, it can be said now that there is a distinction between grossly
circular arguments and rule-circular arguments; particularly, that rule-circular arguments
do not ‘assume’ the rule as a premise, but instead apply it in the argument. Consequently,
Boghossian concludes by another principle, (RC)—“S’s rule-circular argument for a rule of
inference M will confer warrant on S’s belief that M is truth-preserving, provided that M
is a genuinely-meaning constituting rule for S”8—that so long as there is a conceptual role
for the inference in question (that the inference is a meaningful one), then a rule-circular
argument will succeed in taking one from a naive belief about the rule to a warranted one.
In sum, Boghossian’s conceptual role semantics seems to give us a substantial reading
for the meaning of logical connectives and a way of comparing or explaining our behaviour
in relation to logical connectives: conceptual roles exist as behaviour-independent concepts
which have a “semantic value” that differentiates our implicated inferences from other in-
ferences. Particularly, it is the property of truth-preservation that separates the meaningful
connectives and inferences from those which are not; and when dicussing these meaningful
rules, we can construct a justification through rule-circular means. Now, we can explicitly
turn our attention to the capability of conceptual role semantics to deal with Tonk and
our skeptics.
8Boghossian (2000), pg. 250
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1.2 Solutions: Better and Worse
Let’s begin with the problem of ‘bad connectives.’ Tonk appears to be a well-defined
connective (from the perspective of introduction and elimination rules), just as any other
logical connective is (say, the otherwise uncontroversially accepted ‘And’), and yet Tonk
trivializes our language. Any system containing Tonk will license one to infer anything
from anything else. Consequently, its hard to see what Tonk could have ever meant in the
first place, and why we might be justified in using other logical connectives specified in the
same manner. So, how might Boghossian’s position help with warding away connectives
like Tonk without throwing away ‘And’ or ‘If, Then’? So long as we understand ‘genuinely
meaning constituting’ to entail “truth-preserving,” then by the principle (L), one is never
entitled to infer according to Tonk.
So far, so good; but, one may press, this presents a new dilemma: either (A) this
does not stop one from ever having the conceptual role, or the logical idea, specified by
Tonk, only their entitlement to their infence is in question; or (B) it shows that we can
infer—though not entitled to do so—according to Tonk, without there being a conceptual
role at all. In the first case, it seems troubling that we might have conceptual roles
which we are not entitled to. In other words, there is a dependency between our actual
behaviour and the existence of conceptual roles which would rule out large swaths of what
we do (say, any accidental misapplication of ‘if, then’) as meaningless. And in the second
case, it seems troubling because the connection between our behaviour and the meaning-
constituting features of our behaviour (properties of truth-preservation, say) are eroded.
In other words, we can infer, and distinguish or describe our own and other’s inferences,
without reference to an ‘actual’ conceptual role. What then is needed is an account of how
conceptual roles arise at all and, subsequently, what is different about the truth-preserving
connectives that is more than mere convention.
It is not completely clear what sort of metaphysical view would ground this distinction
between meaning-constituting and non-meaning constituting inference rules. On one hand,
an avenue available to Boghossian is a view that we might describe as metaphysically
loaded, in which some connectives somehow exist in the world—i.e. that there are patterns
of inference, some of which have a property of truth-preservation, and meaning-constitution
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derives from a particular pattern having a particular property. In this case, there are facts
and truths about logic, and the genuinely meaning constituting connectives are genuinely
about the world, and (presuming classical logic is correct) the logic we teach with truth
tables is a description of these facts. In a sense, this is captured by Boghossian’s own
comments when he remarks that “there is no proposition expressed by sentences of the
form ‘A tonk B.’”9 In what way would the world have to be such that ‘A tonk B’ was the
unique logical idea needed to describe it? However, it is not clear that this is either the
view that Boghossian is advancing, nor itself a plausible one. For starters, what sort of
experience would one need to have to recognize that ‘And’ was an appropriate description
of the world; and furthermore, how, by what faculty, would such a recognition be made?
On the other hand, and in attempt to avoid such metaphysical qualms, an avenue may
seem available along conventionalist lines alone. So, instead of appealing to the truth-table
‘out there,’ it could be said that this is merely a well-functioning descriptive tool. I will
not attempt to take up such debates here, only note that this does not help conceptual
role semantics; for if it is conventional (by choice) that we appeal to truth-preservation for
meaning, then it is at least possible that a different question (say, of monotonicity instead
of truth-preservation) could be used to determine which connectives are “genuine” and
which are meaning-vacuous.
There is, however, another issue lurking in this discussion of truth as well; namely, the
idea that Tonk does not preserve truth. Recognizing the fact that each half of the Tonk rules
is itself a well-established and truth-preserving rule—where tonk-introduction is identical
to disjunction introduction, and tonk-elimination identical to and-elimination—conflicts
with, as Hale describes, “the well-entrenched, and surely correct, thought that we can’t
pass from true premises to a false conclusion by chaining together steps of reasoning each
of which is truth-preserving.”10 At which particular step in the process does truth fail
to be preserved? Subsequently, it is difficult to see how, conceptual role or not, taking
‘genuinely meaningful’ to entail ‘truth-preserving’ will get one very far to begin with. Are
conceptual roles entities which specify individual rules and so Hale is wrong about about
the “well-entrenched” idea about truth-preservation, or are conceptual roles entities which
9Boghossian (2000), pg. 251
10Hale (2002), pg. 293
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mark out tuples of rules?
That all said, Boghossian admits that his presentation of the position is partly an
“IOU”, to be explained in full in the future, and rightly recognizes the force of many
criticisms. If such a story is to be presented, then perhaps conceptual role semantics is
plausibly positioned to deal with Tonk. What then of the logical skeptics?
Regarding our type-1 skeptics, the IOU still looms large. Recall that this sort of
skeptic questions logical rules to begin with; so, without a story about where conceptual
roles come from and why truth-preservation is the correct question to determine meaning,
the conversation on this front is doomed to fail. If one begins with the idea that ‘if,
then’ is meaningful because it is truth-preserving and that this is a matter of convention,
then the skeptic can merely deny that the rule is meaning-constituing on the grounds of
different conventions. Insofar as conceptual roles are to be identified in opaque non-public
terms (say, ‘the language of thought’)11 one lacks any evidence to show the skeptic for
exactly what reason some logical rule is meaning constituting. If we add in an explanatory
story—say, of the metaphysically rich truth sort—then one is afforded some external basis
to which they may appeal for warrant; but this would also require the caveat that whatever
so figures one person’s conceptual roles is, at least, capable of determining another person’s
conceptual roles. Otherwise, even with this explanatory story, one must contend with two
issues: (1) the skeptic could deny that the formation of your conceptual role was necessary
(that whatever the contingent facts are that arise in one’s belief of, say, ‘And’, leads them
instead to a belief in ‘Tonk’); and (2), if one is capable of forming a conceptual role that
another is not, then what’s to say that one’s belief in ‘Tonk’ is not warranted by their
conceptual roles, roles another person simply has not or could not form?
Boghossian notes this exact line of argument and finds it problematic; not, however,
because of the reasoning. Rather, what Boghossian concludes is that to entertain such
skepticism at the outset is seriously misguided. Instead, one should recognize an underlying
11Boghossian seems to encourage this idea when he says that, regarding the plausbility of (L): “if it is
true that certain of our inferential dispositions fix what we mean by our logical words (in the language
of thought), then it is very plausible that we should be entitled to act on those inferential dispositions
prior to, and independently of, having supplied an explicit justification for the general claim that they
are truth-preserving.” (Boghossian (2000), pg. 250, emphasis mine) That Boghossian is interested in the
language of thought presents an interesting and possible path forward for conceptual role semantics, but
any such discussion would involve a much broader historical discussion of the philosophy of mind.
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and pernicious assumption in epistemology broadly:
The Principle of the Universal Accessibility of Reasons (UAR): “If something
is a genuine reason for believing that p, then,... its rationalizing force ought to
be accessible from any epistemic standpoint.”12
If one holds strong to this idea, that what is a reason for me must be a reason for you,
then they will find the type-1 skeptic compelling; and so, to avoid the argumentative doubt
about which meaning-constitutive logical property is the ‘right’ one, will need an answer
to the conceptual-role IOU. However, Boghossian denies (UAR) and instead advocates for
the idea that there may not be such universal reasons for logic.13 Consequently, there is
both admittance and acceptance that the type-1 skeptic cannot be answered. Whether or
not it makes sense to deny (UAR) is food for thought, but at first glance it should seem
worrisome. If eschewing this principle stops ‘reason-monsters’ from setting the evidential
agenda for everyone else, then maybe it’s not such a bad thing; but if rejecting (UAR) also
stops significant conversations about evidential common ground from taking place, then
perhaps the trade-off is not worth it. What then, of the type-2 skeptic? If someone accepts
the use of a logical rule, but does not assent to or accept it’s conclusions in practice, can
conceptual role semantics say anything about the matter? This involves a much closer look
at rule-circularity and how we might move from ‘mere entitlement’ to actual justification.
12Boghossian (2000), pg. 253
13To be clear, Boghossian does not take this to be a full epistemological position for everything; only
for those skeptical questions, like the existence of the external world, which create sharp and seemingly
unanswerable lines in inquiry.
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1.3 The Role of Rule-Circularity
Boghossian proposes that there are five plausible categories for answering whether or not
logic can be justified (or more particularly, basic logical rules like modus ponens): total
skepticism (no justification), non-factualism about logic (no justification), non-factualism
about justification, default-reasonable beliefs, and rule-circular arguments;14 and consider-
ing the failures of the first four, one must look for a method of rule-circular justification.
Though Boghossian’s particular concern is not as broad as ours, we will see that his con-
struction of rule-circularity is a step-forward to answering the type-2 skeptics; particularly
because the warrant afforded by a rule-circular argument directly addresses the infinite
regress of hypotheses. In section 1.1 we briefly glossed what function rule-circular argu-
mentation served in Boghossian’s overall picture, but now we will need to see exactly what
counts as a rule-circular argument, why it may be permissible, and what consequences one
has.
Crucially, a rule-circular argument is one which relies on the rule ‘in question,’ but
which does not ‘beg the question.’ So, a rule-circular argument is one which establishes
the conclusion of an inference rule, on the basis of that rule, but not with that rule as an
assumed premise. For example, Crispin Wright’s rule-circular argument for Tonk:
1. ‘P tonk Q’ is true iff ‘P’ is true tonk ‘Q’ is true Meaning Postulate
2. P Assumption
3. ‘P’ is true 2, T-Scheme
4. ‘P’ is true tonk ‘Q’ is true 2, tonk-introduction
5. ‘P tonk Q’ is true 4, 1, biconditional-elimination
6. P tonk Q 5, T-Scheme
7. If P, then P tonk Q 6, logic
14See Figure 10.2 and pages 235-236 in: Boghossian (2000)
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Here, the use of tonk-introduction is never explicitly assumed anywhere in the argument
(at least, and importantly, not as a premise); instead, what is being established is that
“this template is available to explain how someone for whom inference in accordance with
tonk-introduction was already part of their unreflective practice could arrive at an explicit
justification for it.”15 And so, a rule-circular argument is really a general strategy for ex-
plaining how an inference rule works, and implicitly why (because of it’s truth-preservation)
it will continue to work: “what we have is an argument that is circular only in the sense
that, in purporting to prove the validity of a given logical law, it must take at least one
step in accordance with that law.”16 The broad idea here is that a rule-circular argument
is an explanation of a rule, it makes explicit the function of a rule, but is not a persuasive
argument because it relies on the prior acceptance of the rule.17
It is worth immediately pointing out that while Boghossian acknowledges that rule-
circular arguments can be posed for any connective, and as we just saw, Tonk included,
he does not want to allow complete freedom in their use; and so, he provides much needed
buffer in the construction of his principle (RC):
“(RC) S’s rule-circular argument for a rule of inference M will confer warrant on
S’s belief that M is truth-preserving, provided that M is a genuinely meaning-
constituting rule for S.”18
Now, it would seem, that we can answer the type-2 skeptic without giving up ground to all
connectives. A rule-circular argument provides justification for our conclusions by a rule of
inference so long as that inferential pattern is “genuinely meaning constituting.” If Tortoise
were to ask for a further hypothetical, the rule-circular-arguer could refuse to entertain the
regress on the grounds of the rule’s validity being proven; Achilles could respond by saying
‘look you have accepted that modus ponens is a valid inference, and so you can entertain
as many hypotheticals as you want but it will not matter—“one step” in accordance with
the rule is all that was needed to show this conclusion must be right.’ This will be an
important tool to keep in our pocket going forward, but note that in it’s current form, the
15Boghossian (2000), pg. 247
16Boghossian (2000), pg. 245
17This distinction originally shows up in Dummett’s work as the difference between ‘pragmatic’ and
‘vicious’ circularity. See: Dummett (1991), especially Chapter 9.
18Boghossian (2000), pg. 250
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success of rule-circular arguments depends upon the same problematic story from earlier:
how exactly do we know when a rule is genuinely meaning-constituting? The visage of our
‘IOU’ comes into focus once again.
When discussing the source of entitlement, Boghossian rightly confronts this exact line
of questioning:
“What makes a rule meaning-constituting? This is one of the questions that
still awaits a definitive answer. My present concern, however, is just to em-
phasize that our problem about our entitlement to employ a rule of inference
reduces to that problem, a problem that any conceptual-role semantics faces.”19
And so what we can take away from this, is that (RC) is not a strategy solely related
to conceptual role semantics. The principle (L) tells us that we are entitled to infer by
genuinely meaning-constituting rules even if we have not gone on to show their validity
or provide some other justification—that is, (L) tells us which rules we should want to
construct rule-circular arguments for. Unless it can be shown that the only way to make
a rule meaning-constituting is through the conceptual role that has some ‘semantic value,’
then it would seem that both (L) and (RC) are really general strategic moves available to
a variety of positions. The questions that follow, among others, are which positions, how,
and why? However, it is far from the present concern to attempt to answer this in detail.
What should be noted is that unless another epistemological position contains some other
principle, call it (NoRC), which states ‘if M is an inferential rule for S, meaning constituting
or not, then S is entitled to infer according to M, only when an independent and explicit
justification for M has been provided,’ then the rule-circular approach is ‘allowed.’ This is
of importance, if only, because the explanation which rule-circular arguments afford make
quick work of the type-2 skeptic and it is in our interest, then, to find other positions
compatible with rule-circular argumentation.20
To conclude, Boghossian provided us with an argumentative strategy for dealing with
Carroll’s Tortoise, but failed to provide a compelling account of what it meant for some
19Boghossian (2000), pg. 250
20Authors may rightly express doubts or concerns about the use of rule-circular argumentation, but
these hesitations should not be confused with genuine incompatability. Avoiding the use of a tool is, of
course, quite different from being unable to use some tool.
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logical rule to be “meaning-constituting.” Subsequently, the attempt to rule out Tonk was
undermined and the type-1 skeptic unanswered. These further issues followed entirely from
postulating a conceptual role which fixed the meaning of connectives, and it was shown
that neither (L) or (RC) were implicated in the problems. Now, the following two chapters
will explore a couple of alternative epistemic ideas which capture two broader strands of
approaches to the justification of logic. The first will primarily focus on Bob Hale’s idea
of the ‘minimal inference kit,’ and the latter, Hartry Field’s non-factualism about logic.
I will attempt to show what these positions are and how they differ; what the problems
with the views are; and whether or not they are amenable to rule-circular argumentation,
so that we may come to find an adequate answer to all three of our problems.
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Chapter 2
Logic with an Epistemological Foundation
Five key claims differentiate Hale’s justification of logic:
1. That logical knowledge is “a priori knowledge of a conceptual necessity.”1
2. That we must accept a principle which underpins what it means to understand some-
thing; namely, that acceptance of logical concepts is necessary for understanding
them.2
3. That the minimum standard of acceptability for a logical rule is that it be sound,
that it will never lead from true premises to a false conclusion.
4. That we must accept a principle which explains our entitlement; namely, that one is
entitled to a logical belief when that belief is “immune to rational doubt.”3
U. That rule-circular arguments are not capable of justifying one’s use of a logical rule.
The first item can be better explained by saying that there are facts about our logical
connectives, like their being able to preserve truth or not, which we come to know apart
1Hale (2002), pg. 283
2We focus on logical concepts here for two reasons: first, both Hale and this thesis are primarily
concerned with logic; and secondly (and more importantly), it is not clear that Hale believes that this
principle will apply to all concepts or only those concepts outlined by the first item. There is a much
broader reading of “acceptance as understanding” which would implicate discussion of ‘slabs’ and ‘chairs’
and take us full course into “meaning as use” but this is not clearly what Hale has in mind. Later, I will
drop specific reference to logical concepts, but this a matter of convenience—one may continue to read
this principle as always and only referring to logical concepts.
3Hale (2002), pg. 304
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from any sort of empirical discovery. These facts are significant because, in modal terms,
they stand in a necessity relationship to all possible sets of principles (or, axioms, if one
prefers) and their negation stands in no possibility relationship to any possible sets of
principles.4 In other words, these facts about the connectives, like their truth-preservation,
are True—they are unchanging, immutable, indefeasible, could not be any other way—and
any doubt about these facts, as a priori concepts, while possible to be raised, could never
be substantiated. This is not just to say that ‘facts of the matter’ lead us to say these
concepts are true, but that it is by the nature of the concept itself that it is true.
The principle of the second claim, that acceptance is necessary for understanding, tells
us that if one properly understood some concept, then they would behave in accordance
with it. In the realm of logic, what Hale is after is a reading of logical connectives such
that if one can be said to properly understand what “if, then” means, for example, then
they would not deny the conclusion in a modus ponens argument—they would behave in
accordance with it. As foreshadowing, then, “acceptance as understanding” is a principle
aimed to discount the type-2 skeptic: how could one claim to know what the conditional
means and, when presented with a well-formed modus ponens argument, refuse to assent to
its conclusion? We will also see that this principle directly addresses, more generally, those
who would doubt the sorts of conceptual necessities Hale takes basic logical knowledge to
be.
The third item tells us by what means we will differentiate “genuinely meaning-
constituting” rules from ‘meaning-vacuous’ rules (to use Boghossian’s distinction). Hale
argues that a truth-preservation criterion will not adequately bar us from using connectives
like Tonk (for the Tonk rules are comprised of two otherwise accepted and truth-preserving
rules), but that when we turn our attention to soundness, we will be left with a much more
restricted set of connectives. More particularly, the soundness of many rules can be proved
from the assumption of a much smaller set of rules, a ‘minimal kit’—the rules for the
4This technical definition is intended to capture Hale’s discussion of those concepts which may be
relatively necessary compared to absolutely necessary; and the use of ‘principles’ is intended to capture
the notion of “laws” which make sets of premises. For example, it may be that some proposition p must
be true, but this is because of ‘the laws of physics;’ and so taking the laws of physics to be represented
by φ we would say that p is “φ-ly necessary”. See: Hale (2002), pg. 280-283 for further detail. However,
the reader may gloss this understanding of absolutely necessary in favour of “could not be any other way”
and do just as well.
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conditional operator and universal quantification. Of course, one may note that this leaves
modus ponens and quantification as assumed, but this is where item four comes into play.
One is entitled to an inference patterm if that pattern is immune to doubt. The picture to
come will try to show that the minimal kit of rules satisfies the sort of conceptual properties
of item one, and that then concepts of the sort item one specifies satisfy the conditions of
item 4.
Finally, ‘item U’ tells us that rule-circularity is a seemingly unsatisfactory approach
to justification. I mark this claim separately because while Hale advocates for avoiding
rule-circular argumentation, it is not clear that he could not employ some principle like
Boghossian’s (RC). Particularly, Hale presents three complaints that one must wrestle
with. First, it is not clear that the rule is not being ‘assumed’ and so that it is not vicious
circularity when we focus on soundness. Here, the worry is that proofs of soundness, say for
modus ponens, depend upon the soundness of modus ponens; and so, an assent to the rule
as sound is already being taken for granted.5 Second, it is not clear that rule-circularity
is not viciously circular when we focus on knowledge, when we focus on how we come to
know rules. Here, the worry is that the explanatory aspect of rule-circularity does not
provide us with any epistemological footing for our use of the rule, it merely explains our
coming to a conclusion. And third, it is not clear how we might constrain rule-circular
argumentation. Here, the worry is that we will allow a justification of bad connectives if
we do not have some further specification (and what could that specification possibly be?)
for rule-circularity.6
It is important to recognize that these criticisms are not new to our discussion of
rule-circularity. In the case of soundness what we really have is a special case of the
circularity generally—all rule circular arguments require at least one step with the rule.
That we should be careful about soundness is a product of Hale’s position on soundness
proofs being the correct tool for justifying rules and his own concern that this will involve
circularity. When focusing on the circularity in ‘knowledge,’ we are really calling into
question the explanatory vs. persusive distinction to begin with—the difference between
a rule-circular argument explaining away our regress of hypotheticals, and a rule-circular
5Note, one might reasonably read this as Hale invoking the type-1 skeptic. Boghossian asked for only
“one step” in accordance with the rule, but this, to Hale, is already begging the question.
6See: Hale (2002), pg. 285-288
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argument convincing a type-1 skeptic. Yet, a rule-circular argument can be restricted to
the narrow use of explanation and justificaton. And finally, Hale’s concern for constraining
rule-circular arguments we have seen come up explicitly in the construction of Boghossian’s
(RC) already. This criticism would only apply in cases where one did not include the
“genuinely meaning-constituting” aspect.
In summary, Hale’s position goes something like this...
One is entitled to their logical belief when it is immune to doubt. This will
mean that one is only entitled to those beliefs which are a conceptual neces-
sity—a priori and inconceivably, impossibly false. Those logical beliefs which
are conceptual necessities are the one’s which must be assumed to put forward
proofs or make arguments about other logical beliefs. In other words, one will
always be entitled without qualification to modus ponens and universal quan-
tification introduction, because these are the only rules which cannot be proved
without assumption.7 And if someone were to attempt to doubt such a logical
belief, they will really have shown themselves to misunderstand the belief; for
if they grasped the meaning of the belief, then they would have acted in accor-
dance with it. Finally, no route seems available by rule-circular argumentation.
Now, then, we may turn our attention to how this position deals with our guiding issues.
7Admittedly, Hale also seems to think that the strategy of a reductio should be included in this set,
but recognizing the discussion of negation to be out of scope, sticks only with quantification and the
conditional.
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2.1 Problems (Two Different Ones)
In similar fashion to the first chapter, let’s begin with Tonk. How does Hale’s view ward
off problematic connectives? There is a trivial sense in which Tonk fails to be discounted by
our gloss of Hale: of course it could be used to prove things about other logical beliefs—one
literally can make a tonk-argument—but this would not put Tonk on the same playing field
as other connectives, like the conditional, for two reasons: (1) it is not clear that Tonk is
a conceptual necessity; and (2) it is not clear that, if we restrict our interest to proofs of
soundness, that Tonk is a practical necessity. What I mean to point out here is Hale’s idea
that whatever connectives we are going to accept without a supporting explicit argument
should be “indispensable.”8 To see how this works, we can examine Hale’s argument for
the unsoundness of Tonk:
1. Tonk-intro allows you to make any inference of the form ‘A, so A tonk B’
2. If the inference: ‘p, so p tonk q’ is of the form ‘A, so A tonk B’, then tonk-intro
allows you to make it
3. The inference: ‘p, so p tonk q’ is of the form ‘A, so A tonk B’
4. Tonk-intro allows you to infer ‘p tonk q’ from ‘p’
5. Tonk-elim allows you to make any inference of the form ‘A tonk B, so B’
6. If the inference: ‘p tonk q, so q’ is of the form ‘A tonk B, so B’, then tonk-elim allows
you to make it
7. The inference: ‘p tonk q, so q’ is of the form ‘A tonk B, so B’
8. Tonk-elim allows you to infer ‘q‘ from ‘p tonk q’
9. Tonk-intro and tonk-elim allow you to infer ‘q’ from ‘p’
10. The tonk rules together allow you to derive any conclusion from any premise
8Hale (2002), pg. 299
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11. Hence, Tonk is not sound
Lines [1.] and [5.] are meaning postulates for the rules of Tonk, and every other line
is either an instance of universal instantiation or one of the conditional’s rules. Hale’s
idea in working through this proof is to show that “any vindication of a doubt about the
conservativeness (or, more generally, the soundness) of any rules of inference must involve
reasoning which doesn’t use those rules, but uses some other rules instead—rules whose
reliability is assumed in that reasoning;”9 and while it is not immediately obvious that
modus ponens will always be the rules needed to prove soundness for any other rule, Hale
contends that “any rule(s) of inference whose soundness we may wish to consider will—or
so I think we may assume—be both general and conditional—general, in the sense that
their explicit forumulation tells us that a conclusion of some specified general form may
be drawn from premises of some specified general form, and conditional, in the sense that
they tell us that given premises of the specified form, a conclusion of the specified form
may be drawn.”10
The result is a “minimal kit” of inferences comprising of the conditional and universal
quantification, which must be, in some sense, taken for granted, since any attempt to prove
their soundness will be circular (since all proofs of soundness are conditional and general);
and note, this kit does not include Tonk, for there is little sense in which Tonk will be
“indispensable” to proving soundness. So far, so good; though it would seem that both
skeptics have a fair bit to say on the matter. Beginning with the type-2 skeptic, what
might Hale then say to one who accepts some rule, say the whole ‘minimal kit,’ but refuses
to assent to the conclusion of one of its applications?
Regarding this issue, the principle of “acceptance as understanding” makes quick work
of Carroll’s Tortoise: any skeptic simply does not understand the rule they are doubting.
It is a necessary condition of their properly understanding the rule that they accepted it,
and they doubted it; so, they did not accept it; so, they did not understand it; so, it would
seem, their doubt should not be taken seriously. On this principle, Tortoise should consider
giving up Euclid for football. Before declaring the matter dealt with, however, exactly how
this principle is functioning will be worth a moment of close inspection. Particularly, there
9Hale (2002), pg. 296-297
10Hale (2002), pg. 299
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appear to be two issues: how do we square acceptance as understanding with Hale’s position
against Tonk; and, how do we deal with the anomolous cases of competent dissidents?
For the first issue, we can break down acceptance as understanding into two separate
theses: the stronger, that acceptance is sufficient for understanding; and the weaker, that
acceptance is constitutive, but only necessary. Owing his argument against the stronger to
Paul Horwich, Hale points out that if acceptance were sufficient for understanding, then
we would be ‘opening the flood-gates’ on logical truths and connectives, since it is at least
conceivable that one might accept Tonk no matter how unintuitive the inferential rule
is. Consequently, Hale urges the weaker notion, that acceptance is ‘merely’ necessary. In
this way, there is compatability between this view of meaning and the restriction of the
viable inference rules to only those which are sound, as connectives like Tonk are shown
not to have a genuine meaning (what would it be like for someone to accept Tonk?), but
connectives like ‘if, then’ and ‘and’ do. This is not to say that ‘and’ could be assumed
unproblematically, like ‘if, then,’ but instead that a non-circular soundness proof, using
the minimal kit alone, could be provided for ‘and’ and this would count it as a genuinely
meaningful connective. However, what is needed now is a way to deal with those who
would doubt rules we want to protect.
The thrust of acceptance as understanding is that one who does not behave in ac-
cordance with the principle is mistaken about the logical belief in question, but potent
doubts often come from those who understand the belief in question. For instance, Vann
McGee’s proposal for a counter-example to modus ponens might be swiftly shrugged off as
the misunderstandings of a logical apprentice; but it is precisely his accomplishments and
thoroughness with the topic that warrants serious consideration of the so-called ‘counter-
example.’11 So, one might consider the following (of many other examples McGee provides):
I see what looks like a large fish writhing in a fisherman’s net a ways off. I
believe
If that creature is a fish, then if it has lungs, it’s a lungfish.
That, after all, is what one means by “lungfish.” Yet, even though I believe the
antecedent of this conditional, I do not conclude
If that creature has lungs, it’s a lungfish.
11McGee (1985)
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Lungfishes are rare, oddly shaped, and, to my knowledge, appear only in fresh
water. It is more likely that, even though it does not look like one, the animal
in the net is a porpoise.12
The problem here—why one would not assent to the conclusion ‘if that creature has lungs,
it’s a lungfish’—is due to the nesting of conditionals. When performing a ‘translation’ of
beliefs or language into logic, arguments of the form pIf φ, then if ψ then θq, require one,
at least sometimes, to assent to the truth of otherwise unintuitive or implausible beliefs.
McGee reasons that this is because our own practices reflect a further ‘law of exportation’
which states that...
pIf φ and ψ, then θq entails pIf φ, then if ψ then θq.
and so there is a “tension between modus ponens and the law of exportation. According
to the classical account, which does not recognize any conditional other than the material,
both are valid; but we will not expect them both to come out valid on any nonclassical
account.”13 Hale addresses this sort of concern directly and concludes that if someone
can intelligibly raise the doubt to begin with, then really the thing they assented to and
accepted was never quite the thing so doubted.14 In this case, that the doubt was never
about classical modus ponens, but about our non-classical use of natural language and the
relevant conditional operator for that.
So, regarding McGee’s counter-example, we would say that there is an unrestricted
version and a restricted version of modus ponens, where the restricted version cuts off
those arguments which would “essentially involve as major premises conditionals whose
consequents are themselves conditional.”15 Then, any doubt about modus ponens will
be of the unrestricted version, and what was really meant by modus ponens was the
appropriately restricted version all along.
This certainly gets one around the problem: any genuine doubt means you never
had genuine meaning for the thing doubted to begin with; but it is difficult, then, to
see how this principle might help address Carroll’s Tortoise. Given the type-2 skeptic,
12McGee (1985), pg. 462-463
13McGee (1985), pg. 466
14See: Hale (2002), footnote 18
15Hale (2002), pg. 291 in footnote
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we either shrug them off as not understanding the principle in question, or we admit
their hesitation but claim that the principle so explicitly stated was never the principle
in question. Behind every explicitly stated rule that could be questioned would be the
unstated and ‘real’ meaning. In practice this might likely not amount to anything,16 even
if one was to move towards another method of fixing the meaning—be it truth conditions or
‘conditions of correct assertion’—it would not change the fact that certain logical concepts
were of conceptual necessity ; but it would leave open the curious fact that those logical
beliefs taken to be a priori and necessary are subject to change, insofar as we thought we
made reference to them, ‘later.’17 This, however, should not be seen as fatal to Hale’s
position, only that it raises some discomfort given the seeming ineffability of those very
concepts we take ourselves to be entitled to.
This discussion raises one further point; namely, that Hale presents two distinct
projects that one might attempt to solve:
A : Explaining how we can come to know that basic rules such as modus ponens are
sound.
B : Explaining why it is not possible intelligently (i.e. clear-headedly and coherently)
to doubt the soundness of basic rules such as [modus ponens ].18
The principle of ‘acceptance as understanding’ only seriously applies towards project B.
The ‘ineffability’ so discussed, exposes the inability for our assent through practice to
explain how we grasp logical concepts; but this is really no price at all to pay, it was never
Hale’s intent to have the principle of acceptance as understanding solve all of the issues.
So far, then, we’ve seen this non-rule-circular position make quick work of the issues at
hand; however, our type-1 skeptic will require a little more effort to handle.
In the following section I will spell out how Hale might come to answer this skeptic,
but also what problems this commits us to; and particularly, I will show that we are left
with an IOU that is no better off than Boghossian’s. Then, in section 2.3 I will attempt to
relate Hale’s position to a broader category of positions called “default-reasonable beliefs.”
16Indeed Hale seems to think so when he claims that everything in the paper following his discussion of
McGee could be “recast” to the better formed resrictred modus ponens.
17Say, by further reflection, or even a posteriori experience.
18Hale (2002), pg. 289
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In doing so, one may note that the narrow discussions thus far are more broadly applicable
than they first appear. Finally, in section 2.4, we will take stock of what issues are on the
table and where progress may be made.
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2.2 Intellectual Recognition
Before setting off into the nuances of Hale’s theory, it is worth asking why the type-1
skeptic may not be immediately answered by the ‘acceptance as understanding’ principle.
If the type-2 skeptic could be disregarded as not knowing what they were talking about
when they claimed to understand modus ponens but refused to assent to its conclusion,
then why can’t one say the same for the type-1 skeptic who refuses to accept modus
ponens to begn with? Recall, that in the discussion of Boghossian, the type-1 skeptic’s
doubt could be understood as a question about whether or not the rule in question was
genuinely meaning constituting. If what makes a rule meaningful is just one’s acceptance
of it, then we run into the strong view that Horwich criticized; and if we go with the
partly necessary view that Hale proposes, then there must be some further way of fixing
the meaning.
Here is the crux of the issue—for if Hale were challenged, ‘and why modus ponens?
how is modus ponens “genuinely meaning constituting”?’, there is no clear story. Surely
introduction and elimination rules would play a part; one’s acceptance of the rule (and
so the behaviour that shows acceptance); and the aspects of the rule that might make it
conceptually necessary, i.e. its soundness; but seemingly the picture that these conditions
give together still does not provide a clear answer to our type-1 skeptic, for, I argue,
this instance of the skeptical worry is pushing on a prior step in the argument. Unless
one can provide a positive argument for modus ponens, then the negative argument (that
it’s soundness could not be doubted), will do little to unseat the skeptic—if they take
themselves to know some other connective, then why should they abandon their logical
system? And this is, in effect, to push on Hale’s first project, ‘project A.’
Unfortunately, there is no quick answer. Hale ‘shelves’ the question of how we may
come to know logical soundness, banking on the hope that in answering ‘Project B’ we
may come to have some idea of how to make progress.19 So, then, what is the supposed
lesson of project B?
I propose that there are two ways of understanding Hale’s argument: on the one hand,
and closer to the spirit of Hale’s paper, there is something particularly special about those
19Hale (2002), pg. 290
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rules which appear in our minimal inference kit, and we come to know of these rules ‘first;’20
on the other hand, the relevant logical facts are, in a sense, ‘beyond us’ and so the sort of
knowledge that we are talking about is the high bar we never really obtain.
The second interpretation is quite a liberal reading of Hale. Indeed, it is so far from
the thrust of the paper, that it barely could be seen as the same position; but, it is worth
mentioning, if only to note the landscape of available positions. In saying that logical
facts are ‘beyond us,’ what is being noted is that the conditions of generality and necessity
make logic transcendental. Perhaps it is true that “some of us, at least some of the time...
are inclined to believe that we know” some logical fact,21 but a minor lesson that could
be had from Carroll’s Tortoise, Tonk, and discussions around the justification of logic, is
that this feeling of certainty, of knowing, is contingent to our practice. Alerting one to
a possible counter-example, or asking them to justify their use of some taken-for-granted
logical inference, brings about a whole suite of behaviour—constructing proofs, providing a
rule-circular argument, attempting to find further counter-examples, performing a reductio,
etc.—which Hale recognizes as being unsatisfactory for showing how we have the knowledge
we do. Thus, the position would look something like this:...
The minimal inference kit is no more special than any other and the fact that
it is indispensable to proving soundness is an interesting property which may
be used to explain why it is more difficult (maybe so much more so it seems im-
possible) to doubt than any other set of inferential patterns. It may be the case
that, for example, we are beholden to conceptual limits—just the ones that map
to the logical facts—but this will do little for explaining any sort of ‘knowledge,’
since we are not reasoners ‘in the limit.’ One’s doubts about logical facts are
entirely reasonable insofar as we have no special access to the transcendental
20To spell this notion of ‘first’ out a little more: In some sense, because the minimal inference kit rules
are indispensable to our reasoning about (minimally, the soundness of) any other logical idea, there will
be very little to any epistemological story before this inference kit comes into play. Perhaps we might have
certain intuitions or beliefs which are otherwise unconstrained, but once we talk of knowledge, however we
might attempt to do so, these inferences will come first. Thus, the goal is to tell a story which ensures that
once we can say some agent has knowledge (at least of anything general or conditional), then whatever
that knowledge may be, it comes with the minimal kit—whether that means that prior knowledge of the
kit was used, or that the agent learned both things simultaneously, or that there was never any other
physical possibility, that we just do think with those rules that are of conceptual necessity.
21Hale (2002), pg. 279
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truths. In just the way that genuine doubts expose our accidental reasoning
about the meaning of connectives, ‘acceptance as understanding’ shows we are
mistaken about logical truths given our inability to reason transcendentally;
yet, all but the most unmovable skeptic will accept the overwhelming amount
of logical practice and argument that we can contingently provide.
Now, though the above interpretation is entirely made up of the key ideas of Hale’s posi-
tion, one can see where the divide lay: this doesn’t seem to give us knowledge at all! That
our practices are moved by the invisible hand of logical reason seems to explain away the
possibility of knowing otherwise without telling us that we actually know anything. Fur-
thermore, Hale finds that “appeals at this point to self-evidence or to rational insight—to
a supposed capacity to discern things by the light of reason—... seem to amount to rela-
beling our problem rather than making a significant contribution towards its solution.”22
How else, other than the light of reason, might one close the gap between transcendental
conceptual limits and actual reasoning practice? This leaves us then with the first inter-
pretation, that there really is some priority to those inferences in our minimal kit, and
that they will then figure in an epistemological story somehow and before other sorts of
knowledge.
It seems to me that there are a variety of such epistemological stories which would
get at something similar to what Hale is looking for, but Hale concludes the paper with
the thought that there may be no inferential ‘gap’ between explaining how something is
impossible to be doubted and how it can be known (there would certainly be a gap, just
not one so structured by inferential reasoning), and that, instead, we may bear out the
conditions for knowledge in terms of beliefs: “To know that p is to have a true belief
that p and to be entitled to that belief... she may satisfy the entitlement condition by
believing something it is impossible—and so impossible for her—rationally to doubt.”23
Of importance to note about this condition is the fact that the impossibility of doubt is
not relative to the believer, it is a fact beyond the believer that they cannot doubt p and
so it is this fact which independently justifies, or gives entitlement to, the belief; and so
too, it should be noted, is the fact that p is true. So, Hale has provided a justificatory
22Hale (2002), pg. 284
23Hale (2002), pg. 302-303
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framework for individual’s beliefs which, in a sense, does not actually rely on their believing
at all. Universal quantification and conditional inference seem to fit the bill on true and
undoubtable beliefs, but this is still no story at all about how we come to these facts.
Earlier in the paper, Hale quietly attempts to address part of this concern. In a foot-
note attached to the discussion of the proof of Tonk’s being unsound, Hale ponders by what
right we can claim the truths of premises [3.] and [7.]24 Though their truth may be “obvi-
ous,” providing a compelling answer of how we know this is problematic. Hale considers it
implausible for knowledge of their truth to be got inferentially, for “quite apart from the
difficulty of coming up with any even remotely plausible premises from which such state-
ments might be drawn as conclusions, it seems clear that any such inferential answer would
set going a vicious infinite regress, of a piece with that into which Carroll’s wily Tortoise
enveigles the unwary Achilles.”25 The idea here is precursor to the point of indispensabil-
ity, and so the infinite regress cited is just the sort found in a rule-circular argument. This
said, Hale also forwards some preliminary commentary on how we may know the truth of
the inference in question; particularly, that he “can see no alternative to acknowledging
that what is involved here is a species of non-inferential intellectual recognition—which we
may as well call rational insight, and which has an indispensable role to play whenever we
operate with rules of inference.” This is not meant to be taken in quite the same way that
sense-datum theorists will claim perception is non-inferential, but instead, is restrictively
taken to mediate “recognition of particular inferences as exemplifying general rules.”26
So, how might this ‘restricted’ rational insight help in getting us from our believing
to conceptual necessary facts? If, as Hale indicates here, it is a merely a piece of rational
thought that we may move from particular instances to generals, and from generals to
particulars—that is, employ universal quantification—then we have some way of framing
our beliefs in accord with the sort of conceptual general necessity that logical facts are
taken to have despite the nature of our contingent and non-transcendental thought;27 but,
24For the reader’s reference:
[3.] The inference: ‘p, so p tonk q’ is of the form ‘A, so A tonk B’
[7.] The inference: ‘p tonk q, so q’ is of the form ‘A tonk B, so B’
25Hale (2002), pg. 298, footnote 24.
26Hale (2002), pg. 298, footnote 24.
27And one may note here that this is is now a reading much closer to the one we inititally took to be
32
it would seem, this also takes us far away from the humble characterization of indispensable
already taken on board. It is no longer just that we cannot doubt universal quantification,
but instead that the overall characterization of thought depends upon this ‘minimal kit.’
Now, perhaps, our minimal kit is even smaller than supposed and what we have really
landed upon is a new criterion with less baggage; but this would be to confuse the role of
the claims. The ‘minimal kit’ arose as those connectives which we had to assume on pain
of circularity. To say that our recognition of logical facts depends upon just the inferences
we cannot doubt, precisely because we cannot doubt them, and we cannot doubt them
because we recognize, in argument, their indispensability, precisely because of the logical
facts uncovered in the process, is as circular as any inferential argument.
What then, is the type-1 skeptic left with? It would seem, an IOU on how we come
to know conceptual necessities. Just as with Boghossian, the rest of the picture may hang
together nicely enough to address the type-2 skeptic and limit our connectives, at least
enough, to rule out Tonk, but the type-1 skeptic is given only an outstanding epistemolog-
ical story.
In the following section, the connections between the view just expressed here and
“default-reasonable beliefs” will be explored. Particularly, I will try to show that the
epistemological IOU is much the same as Hale’s and so we can begin to rule out an even
broader class of views which take this approach. Then, in the following section, we will
return to discussing the specific conclusions from the discussion of Hale in these past
sections, and Boghossian in the past chapter.
far from the spirit of Hale’s position.
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2.3 Default Reasonable Beliefs
This section will draw comparisons between Hale’s view and the broader category of
views dubbed ‘default reasonable beliefs.’ I will attempt to show that the relationship
between ‘intellectual recognition’ and ‘default reasonableness’ functions quite the same way;
and so consequently, that the same issue with the type-1 skeptic will appear. Following
Boghossian’s characterization of “default reasonable beliefs,”28 they are those beliefs which
are “simply ‘default reasonable,’ reasonable in and of themselves, without any supporting
justification... It is reasonable to believe them, but not because there is some positive
ground by virtue of which they are reasonable.”29 In other words, they are beliefs which
are justified because they are prima facie reasonable—no more and no less need be said.
Though this is not a fundamental part of the position, Boghossian continues to spell out
his take on it by appealing to a further condition on grounds of plausibility; particularly,
that the sort of justification such beliefs are given is that they are “presumptively but
defeasibly justified.”30
Now, Hale certainly never indicated that anything could serve as a basis for logical
knowledge. To claim that would be an interpretative mistake of the highest degree; but
what discussion of “intellectual recognition” reveals is that we have justification for be-
lieving in universal quantification, for example, due to it’s ‘rational obviousness’—little
positive ground indeed. That said, Boghossian’s initial characterization is attempting to
pick up on what he takes to be a broader strategy or trend among many others, and so
there are a variety of ways we might take something to be default reasonable...
1. “A default reasonable belief is any belief which, by virtue of being presupposed in
any justification that a thinker might have, is neither justifiable nor refutable.”
2. “Beliefs that are default reasonable are those beliefs that a thinker finds ‘self-evident’.”
28His discussion of the matter does a good job of joining together many positions. There are others,
particularly Hartry Field, who discuss the issue more directly and ‘on its own terms;’ but their summary
is less rhetorically useful and raises many further concerns. We will return to Field in Chapter 3 when
discussing non-factualism, and there some of his views on default reasonable beliefs will also be presented
29Boghossian (2000), pg. 238
30Boghossian (2000), pg. 238-239.
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3. Default reasonable beliefs are just those beliefs “such that, having those beliefs is a
condition for having one of the concepts ingredient in them.”
In these three accounts, Boghossian casts a wide net for what may be considered a ‘default
reasonableness’ approach to the justification of beliefs. I will not take any of these to be
‘the canonical approach,’ but it can be seen that some of these are more, and some less,
amenable to Hale’s approach—there is a family resemblance between all the positions.
The first characterization gives us one condition by which some belief is default rea-
sonable: that the belief be ‘presupposed in any justification a thinker might have;’ and,
by consequence, the standing of this belief then is ‘neither justifiable nor refutable.’ We
might see this as very closely related to Hale’s own position, as the sorts of beliefs which
are undoubtable, those within our minimal kit of inference, are the ones that we can use to
supply justifications for other logical concepts (via soundness proofs), and which cannot be
refuted (doubted), or justifed themselves (since this would invoke circularity—using modus
ponens to prove the soundness of modus ponens).
There is a further way of understanding how a belief may be ‘presupposed in any
justification’ and this would make this view of default reasonable beliefs closely related to
indispensability. One might, for example, take ‘any justification’ to include those justifica-
tions which fail, or the general acts which, through their performance, grant justification.
Stretching this understanding then, one is only a ‘stone’s throw’ from the idea that this
condition is really calling for those beliefs which are presupposed in our most general
thought—those beliefs which are indispensable to our thought. Wright forwards a clear
conception of this when claiming “a proposition [is] a cornerstone for a given region of
thought just in case it would follow from a lack of warrant for it that one could not ra-
tionally claim warrant for any belief in the region.”31 Cornerstones here are those beliefs
which we could then not do without. Note, however, that this is both a far different view
from Hale’s and a much stronger reading of the default resonable condition.32
Hale is not after the idea that we literally cannot think without some logical concept,
some conceptual necessity—certainly acceptance as understanding shows that we are not
31Wright (2004), pg. 167-168
32There is some promise for indispensability to answer the type-1 skeptic, and we will see this come
about again in chapter three, but not in the way implicated here. To fully discuss Wright’s conception of
cornerstones is far out of the scope of this thesis.
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ideal reasoners and can misunderstand logical concepts—only that we cannot rationally
doubt those certain concepts. And here is why the skeptic’s challenge remains: there
is some non-inferential gap that must be jumped to get to knowledge of these logical
concepts,33 and without this explanation there is no ‘positive ground’ to make one employ
modus ponens, quantification, or whatever else might be in the minimal kit.
What of the idea that beliefs are default-reasonable just when some thinker finds them
‘self-evident?’ I take it that there are two ways of discussing this; namely, charitably and
uncharitably. The uncharitable reading would literally have it that any belief could be so
justified so long as there is someone who is willing to think it evident. Consequently, we
would be discussing a position whereby no belief is ruled out prior to investigation as there
is no principled way to distinguish them—one could always imagine a person who could
possibly believe the idea in question no matter how unjustifiable it seems to anyone else.
Whether or not there is a person who then assents to some particular belief will be our
basis for claiming the belief so justified, but otherwise, one would have to remain agnostic
about the rest. Yet, if Tonk seemed problematic because it allowed us to pass from any
premise to any conclusion, because it forces us to accept that every sentence is true if any
sentence is true, one should be similarly skeptical of the position that all beliefs are either
justified or not not justified. In any case, this is the less interesting of the two readings:
what then, is to be made of this idea if we are charitable interpreters?
It would seem as though there must be some reading of ‘self-evident’ which is not
so ‘radically subjective.’ For example, we might take self-evident to mean undoubtable;
and if this is the case, then what we really have is Hale’s position (and the problems that
come with it). By virtue of one’s intellectual recognition they have afforded themselves
the minimal inference kit, which is neither justifiable, except just in virtue of their intel-
lectual recognition, nor refutable, since the belief in question is of conceptual necessity.
Another strategy might be to take self-evident beliefs to be constrained by some sort of
plausibility condition, like Boghossian’s suggestion for their being “presumptively but de-
feasibly justified.” However, this would take us closer to the uncharitable reading and so
33There may be hope for merging this view of default reasonable beliefs with a rule-circular argument for
justification, but as we saw with Boghossian’s positions, even this ‘inferentialist’ approach will not satisfy
the type-1 skeptic. The view may be default reasonable, but only to the extent that it’s being presupposed
is because of its being genuinely meaning-constituting.
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raise concerns about what is really significant in claiming some beliefs being so justified.
There is potential in this argument if one can provide a set of critera by which logic may
be empirically overturned, but I will not take this discussion up here. What can be said
is that, at the least, this is no obvious position and that if logical concepts are the sort
that Hale outlined, of conceptual necessity, then it is difficult to see how they may ever be
defeasible.34
This leaves Boghossian’s last characterization of default reasonable beliefs; that they
are those beliefs such that “having those beliefs is a condition for having one of the concepts
ingredient in them.” The idea here is that for one to even be said to have the belief in
question, they must “believe a certain proposition containing it.”35 In the case of the
conditional, for example, this would mean that for one to have the logical concept of ‘if,
then,’ then they must also have, or assent to, further beliefs, like logical implication or
the validity of modus ponens, that ‘contain’ the conditional. Or, in Boghossian’s words,
this would amount to the claim that “anyone possessing the concept of conditional would
have to have the belief that MPP is a valid rule of inference.”36 There are, at least, two
important things to note about this.
First, this is a very similar sort of condition to the principle of acceptance as under-
standing. Hale’s idea was that if you did not accept the consequences of the conditional
then you could be said to have misunderstood the conditional to begin with. Here the
idea is that if one does not take on board the consequences of some belief, or necessary
associated properties, then one never really had the same belief in mind to begin with.
However, this leads us to the second important point: this condition was extremely ef-
fective at warding away type-2 skepticism, and largely ineffective at warding away type-1
skepticism. Indeed, Boghossian echoes this concern when he says:
“Surely, one can have and reason with conditional without so much as having
the concept of validity or of logical implication. At most what the theory of
34For the inclined reader, Boghossian provides a discussion of this sort of defeasibility in the context of
the Quinean account of logic (See: Boghossian (2000), pg. 232-234); Hartry Field provides an extensive
defense for logic as the sort of thing which could not ever be empirically defeasible in Field (1996) and we
will discuss his view further in chapter 3; and finally, Nenad Mǐsčević defends a view of an a priori logic
with a posteriori defeasible justification in Mǐsčević (2012)
35Boghossian (2000), pg. 240
36(Boghossian, 2000), pg. 240
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concept possession would license is that inferring according to MPP is part of
the possession condition for conditional, not the belief that MPP is valid. But
what we are after now is the justification for the belief.”37
In this way, default reasonable beliefs with possession conditions might be an apt way to
describe the function of the principle of acceptance as understanding in Hale’s view, but
it would fail to add anything more to the picture—the type-1 skeptic is looking for the
justification of the belief, some positive ground for the belief.
It would seem then that ‘default reasonable beliefs’ does not aid Hale’s view in ad-
dressing the type-1 skeptic (and so, alone, does not address the type-1 skeptic either).
Furthermore, we can see how the epistemic picture provided by Hale is similar to that of
default reasonable beliefs generally. In the following section we will take stock of the criti-
cisms of Boghossian and Hale, and where we have done better or worse at addressing this
thesis’ guiding issues; and then in chapter 3 we will discuss Hartry Field’s non-factualism
which will bring about, among other ideas, default reasonable beliefs and empirical defea-
siblity once more.
37Boghossian (2000), pg. 240
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2.4 The Morals So Far
At this point much ground has been covered, so I would like to briefly restate some of the
positive conclusions and then make some remarks about how we are faring with respect to
our guiding issues.
Lesson 1a: Rule-circularity fills an important niche by conferring warrant to some conclusion
through its explanation of the involved inferential rule. Recall (RC): “S’s rule-circular
argument for a rule of inference M will confer warrant on S’s belief that M is truth-
preserving, provided that M is a genuinely meaning-constituting rule for S.”
As we saw earlier, rule-circular argumentation dealt well with the type-2 skeptic: one
could appropriately ‘discharge’ the infinite regress of hypotheses once one application of
the rule was accepted. And furthermore, the issues that came with rule-circularity were
rather to do with the attempt to spell out “genuinely meaning-constituting” in terms of
conceptual roles.
Lesson 1b: The positions discussed were not fundamentally opposed to this narrow use of rule-
circular argumentation—explaining the justification of our rules rather than per-
suading another to use them or explaining their origin. In other words, they do not
contain, implicitly or explicitly, principles like (NoRC).
Hale certainly hoped to avoid rule-circular argumentation and posed three concerns for it;
however, it was not clear that these criticisms were effectively posed with respect to the use
of rule-circular argumentation given by the principle (RC). Nor was there any indication
that the various default reasonable beliefs approaches would bar one from later justifying
their logical conclusions via rule-circular arguments. Now there is one further ‘lesson’ to
note, but it will require some further explication.
Lesson 2: It is not clear that there is any problem with taking the meaning of a connective to
be given by its introduction and elimination rules.
Of course, this is a bold claim and marks a significant departure from the literature
discussed so far, but it is, I will presently attempt to show, correct. The immediate response
39
would be to claim that Tonk has introduction and elimination rules, but is clearly a ‘bad
connective’—certainly this is the attitude we have taken throughout the thesis and a point
to be upheld—and so a rule’s being “analytically valid” does not give it a genuine meaning;
however, it is this latter point that is not so obvious. A rule may have a genuine meaning
and yet still be a ‘bad rule’ to employ. To better spell out the option under consideration,
Boghossian’s and Hale’s arguments against Tonk should be briefly reconsidered.
On Boghossian’s account, Tonk was a problem to be dealt with because rule-circular
argument seemed unconstrained—there was no other method to justifying logic and it
appeared that we could provide a rule-circular argument for Tonk—and this was circum-
vented by the condition of “genuine meaning” in (L) and (RC).38 One was entitled to infer
by a rule so long as it had a genuine meaning, and one could then justify their inferred
conclusions in accordance with that rule by supplying a rule-circular argument. One may
note, however, that this is only one way of restricting rule-circular arguments and was
strategically chosen for Boghossian’s ‘point-to-come’ about conceptual roles. If conceptual
roles determine the meaning of a rule, then we have a ‘clear path’ from epistemology of
conceptual roles, to entitlement, to warrant. But (L) and (RC) need not share the same
restriction (and as we saw, ‘conceptual roles’ were not without their issues). It may be
that, for example, (L) requires a meaning restriction and (RC) requires a soundness restric-
tion.39 If we take this point in conjunction with the idea that introduction and elimination
rules function fine for determining meaning, then one would be entitled to infer according
to Tonk but not be justified in the conclusion of any Tonk argument.
In Hale’s position we saw a concern for the meaning of connectives to come out in terms
of the necessary but not sufficient condition of one’s acceptance of the logical concept. Tonk
was ruled out because assent to Tonk alone is not enough to give it a genuine meaning
(‘what would it be like for someone to accept Tonk?’) and the ‘minimum bar’ for a
38For the readers reference:
(L) : If M is a genuinely meaning-constituting rule for S, then S is entitled to infer according
to M, independently of having supplied an explicit justification for M.
39Here then, (L) would stay the same and we might amend (RC) like so:
(RCS) : S’s rule-circular argument for a rule of inference M will confer warrant on S’s belief
that M is truth-preserving, provided that M is a sound rule.
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connective would be, instead, its being sound.40 But here one may then note that Hale
was perfectly capable of making sense of Tonk-statements, even proving things about Tonk
(specifically, its unsoundness). What qualities Tonk lacked, and so why it was ruled out
as a bad connective, was ‘conceptual necessity’ and soundness. The question then is, to
co-opt Russell’s distinction: is it possible to differentiate between assent to one’s reference
of a rule,41 and assent to one’s assertion of a rule? Is it possible to differentiate between
genuinely meaningful but not justified uses of a logical concept, and genuinely meaningful
and justified uses of a logical concept?
There is a way in which the questions just posed are useless: ‘of course there are
things justified and things not justified;’ but the arguments posed by Hale and Boghossian
seem to imply that once one ‘has’ a logical rule, license to a particular inference, then they
are justified. And this will be just because one could not ever be licensed to a Tonk-like
inferential pattern. Maybe, once harassed by a pesky Tortoise, one will have to produce
a proof or argument which shows their so being justified, but this a mere inconvenience.
Consequently, the challenge here is to say that one might be properly entitled to all sorts
of logical connectives on the basis of there being appropriate introduction and elimination
rules, but that they would not be justified for any particular actual inference without
meeting some further criteria.
The next chapter will focus on Hartry Field’s non-factualism in an attempt to make
further headway on our guiding problems. Particularly, I will show how some form of rule-
circularity is invoked in Field’s framework for justification and also how a different view
of meaning, and so Tonk, is presented; particularly, one more amenable to the discussion
just above.
40There is a sense here in which Boghossian and Hale are actually striking upon the same idea. In
Boghossian’s case we had to be careful to note that not all logical ideas we reference, like Tonk, might have
conceptual roles (though he does no provide any criteria for when they may); and in Hale’s case, we are
urged to recognize that though we can assent to all sorts of ideas, only some of them will be of “conceptual
necessity.”
41Russell uses the language of “asserted” and “unasserted,” or “considered,” and compares this to the
grammatical notion of a verb and a verbal noun. I use “reference” here to capture these ideas succinctly and
hopefully not to implicate the psychological aspects, which Russell also hopes to avoid, that ‘consideration’
may bring to mind.
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Chapter 3
Logical Methodology and Non-Factualism
This chapter will follow quite the same structure as those previous: I will introduce Field’s
non-factualism, then I will attempt to show how the view does or does not address our
guiding issues, and then bring to the fore any particular residual problems. Since Field’s
non-factualism is an encompassing epistemological view which tackles many issues, the
discussion will be broken up into three sections. The first will explain to what extent Field
takes logic to be an a priori matter and will discuss his distinction between those beliefs
which are weakly a priori compared to properly a priori. The second will explain the role
of an ‘evidential system,’ and how Field takes such systems to be related to our epistemic
‘goals.’ And finally, the third section will explain how deductive logic is justified given
the other commitments. Particularly, I will attempt to show that Field makes a case for
deductive logic being indispensable to our otherwise inductive reasoning, which is itself
indispensable, and that subsequently there is the form of a rule-circular argument.
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3.1 A Priori Logic, Weak and Strong
It was noted briefly in the discussion of Default Reasonable Beliefs that Boghossian was
not their only commentator, and indeed Field has addressed default reasonable beliefs quite
directly. Particularly, in “Apriority as an Evaluative Notion,” he characterizes such beliefs
as those which are weakly a priori: that is, those “that can be reasonably believed without
empirical evidence.”1 So, for example, it might be default reasonable to believe that the
conditional operator is valid; but, so too might be the proposition: ‘people usually tell the
truth.’2 Of course, these two beliefs are worlds apart, but one can see how each might be
plausible without some prior empirical inquiry.
On the other hand, there are those beliefs which are, so to speak, a priori without
qualification (and which I will call ‘properly a priori’),3 and this is a matter of their
satisfying a further condition; namely, their being empirically indefeasible. So, for Field,
properly a priori beliefs are those for which no empirical evidence may overturn their truth.
Consequently, all properly a priori beliefs are weakly a priori, but only some weakly a priori
beliefs will be properly a priori—just those that are empirically indefeasible and plausible
without empirical evidence to begin with.
In the case of “people usually tell the truth,” we have a belief which is a priori in
the weak sense: it is plausible to believe without some empirical study or experience first,
and if some empirical study were done, it may very well be the case that the belief was
overturned, that one found that people do not usually tell the truth. Now, the principles
of deductive logic are certainly weakly a priori in that they are plausible to believe without
a posteriori inquiry, but it is less clear whether or not beliefs in logic principles could ever
be overturned. What way would the world need to be to make a belief in, say, universal
instantiation, wrong?
To spell out Field’s view on this matter will require explaining two points: (1) that
there is some sense in which empirical matters affect logic, but that this does not make
1Field (2000), pg. 117
2Field (2000), pg. 120
3Field wavers on calling these concepts ‘strongly a priori’ and opts instead for simply, ‘a priori.’ The
reader may ignore the addition of ‘properly’ if they so choose, as it is only used for clarity, to denote those
beliefs which are both weakly a priori and empiricially indefeasible.
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them empirically indefeasible; and (2), that there is some sense in which logic is defeasible,
but not empirically so. Regarding the first, Field is particularly interested in the debate
surrounding quantum logic:4 might there ever be a reason for us to abandon classical logic
in favour of quantum logic? There is the immediate case of quantum phenomena which
appear to be measurable and real instances of physical situations which, when translated
into logical propositions, fail to cohere with distributivity laws. However, it is not clear
that such phenomena disprove classical logic, or logics which assume distributivity, or even
the notion of distributivity itself, for such claims do not depend on physical phenomena in
the first place.
Regarding the second point, there is a sense in which logic is defeasible; particularly,
it is conceptually defeasible. On this matter, Field says...
“I am not saying that we can completely dismiss the possibility of replacing
standard logic with a ‘quantum logic’ in which the distributive law is aban-
doned, and of arguing that one of the attractions of this logic over classical
logic is that it would make quantum phenomena less mysterious: that would
be dogmatism. But there are considerable conceptual obstacles to working out
of what it would be like to employ such a logic. For instance, there are obstacles
to explaining the circumstances under which special distributivity assumptions
can be invoked...; and there are obstacles to explaining what the inductive
methods that would go with such a logic would be like... We can’t completely
dismiss the possibility of replacing standard logic with nondistributive logic,
because we can’t completely dismiss the possibility that these conceptual ob-
stacles can be overcome. But overcoming them would be largely a conceptual
matter, not an empirical matter.”5
There are a number of things to take note of in this passage—particularly, the meaning
of those two options which are considered as conceptual obstacles, points we will see in
the coming sections—but I will focus just on the broad idea here; namely, that there are
conceptual obstacles to our use of a priori concepts, and in this case logic.
4See, at least: Field (1996), Field (1998), or Field (2000)
5Field (1998), pg. 15
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The view under consideration here would have it that properly a priori concepts could
not ever be wrong a priori, but that there may be issues with the way that we use them;
and this will be the product of our own conceptual mistakes. This amounts to, in effect,
Field’s idea that “the so-called logical truths are indeed true in the most straightforward
sense; the claim that belief in them is strongly a priori justified, on the other hand, is an
evaluative claim.”6 This is not to say that those beliefs, in say, logic, are not properly a
priori, or strongly a priori, only that having them does not provide any such justification.
If they were so justified, then it would be difficult to see how they may be defeasible,
conceptually or empirically.
In sum, Field would have it that logical concepts are properly a priori, they are plausible
without empirical grounds and empirically indefeasible; but, they are not undoubtable.
Consequently, they may be ‘revised’ in response to conceptual issues, and this will amount
to a change in our epistemic practice with those concepts—and, perhaps, our being justified
or not in using them—rather than an apt response to a recognition that they are not true.
6Field (1996), pg. 370
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3.2 Evidence and Contingent Reasoning
One issue with the first ‘conceptual obstacle’ raised above is the vagueness about what
is meant by “circumstances,” and then how these circumstances affect the applicability of
concepts (especially those we take to be properly a priori, and so true always). However,
Field presents the notion of an evidential system: “a bunch of rules governing what to
believe in what circumstances.”7 Consequently, we can see that the question of ‘under
what circumstances can certain assumptions be invoked’ will depend on one’s evidential
system, the norms or rules they assent to which determine which concepts they believe in
which circumstances.
Of course, this does not completely clear up the matter as one may then pose the
question, among others, ‘how do we get our evidential systems?’8 There appears to be a
circular issue if evidential systems determine what to believe in certain ‘circumstances,’
but those ‘circumstances’ determine the evidential system. For example: if one is dealing
with quantum phenomena, quantum circumstances, and this determines their use of a
non-distributive logic, but that use of the non-distributive logic then determines what to
believe about the quantum phenomena, then it would seem that there is only one possible
thing to believe. Or, it could be that there is but one evidential system always employed
by all people at all times, but this is not the picture that Field has in mind.9 Evidential
systems are themselves contingent, but not upon the circumstances for which they tell us
what to believe; instead, they are relative to our epistemic goals.
Field buries this notion amongst further discussions of externalism, reliablism, natu-
ralism, and so forth, and never quite explicitly states it as such; but a number of passages
support this idea, and particularly, the following:
7Field (1996), pg. 362
8I take it that another important and immediate question is, ‘how do I know what someone else’s (or
for that matter, my own) evidential system is?’ Field proposes that this is an idealization, an evaluation,
and not a properly factive question: “To ascribe to a person an evidential system is to give an idealized
description of his or her belief-forming and belief-retaining behaviour.” (Field (1996), pg. 362) If justifi-
cation in Field’s non-factualism were to depends upon our explicit knowledge of evidential systems, this
would present a problem; however, we will see later how his approach to justification allows us to avoid
this issue.
9Nor, the reader may note, does it appear to present a compelling epistemic story. How do we recognize
this system? How do we come to know we have the system? Perhaps, through intellectual recognition...
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“A first advantage of this non-factualist approach is simply that we have some
idea how to go about deciding whether to employ an evidential system with
certain features...: what is involved in deciding to employ a certain sort of
evidential system is seeing how well such a policy would accord with one’s
epistemic goals.”10
And so, the circularity noted is avoided. Evidential systems are relative to the epistemic
goals we have in mind—what we want to know about, and what epistemic values we
may have regarding our results (for example, expressive power or reliability)—and when
applied to the world, to certain circumstances, determine what we believe. For clarity’s
sake (particularly, when there are many goals in discussion) I will use the word ‘domain’ to
indicate those goals which specify what we want to know, and ‘goal’ or ‘value’ to indicate
those goals which specify certain qualities of our conclusions (i.e. that they are reliable or
powerful).11 One is not forced to use a certain evidential system, instead evidential systems
are relative to the epistemic goals one has, in the sense that which evidential system is the
appropriate one for us to use depends on which one best enables us to meet our goals.
One might be tempted at this point to claim non-factualism to be relativism on two
accounts: first, if our evidential systems are goal dependent and we do not restrict what
goals are permissible, then any evidential system would be allowed; and second, if logical
concepts are subject to change according to one’s evidential system, then we may be
inadvertently licensing one to infer by Tonk rules. The latter of these two points will be
discussed partially in the following section, and then again in different terms in section 3.4;
but the first may be addressed now.
Given the assumption that people select the best (or at least, plausibly good) eviden-
tial systems for their epistemic goals, then it would seem that, without restricting one’s
goals, there could be, in principle, goals that would call for evidential systems otherwise
considered questionable.12 For example, if we consider a potential epistemic goal to be pre-
dicting the future of one’s romantic relationships—to come to know, and assent to, those
10Field (1996), pg. 377
11Field, unfortunately, provides no clear distinction of his own and uses goal to describe everything.
This is a feature of his theory, as it should help one to see the ever-dependent nature of methodology to
prior epistemic dispositions, i.e. goals; however, discussion can become quickly confused without some
linguistic separation.
12One might be tempted at this point to say that people ‘ought’ to select the evidential system which is
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relevant propositions—then we may license, as a plausible evidential system, the practice
of tea leaf reading. Tasseography, at least, has a history of such predictions.
That said, it is not clear that we are allowing one to infer by tasseography always ;
but rather, there is a set of goals, pertaining to what we may know or what qualities of
that knowledge we may value, which tasseography will sometimes be better suited for and
sometimes not suited for at all. If a cosmologist were to attempt to predict one’s romantic
relationships, for example, then one might be far more skeptical of their conclusion than
they might be of, say, their fortune-teller’s conclusions. In other words, there may be epis-
temic goals we have for which there are no apt methodologies—practices which do signifi-
cantly better than chance—and so, relative to those goals, otherwise reliable methodologies
(cosmology) do no better than otherwise poor methodologies (tea leaf reading). So, this
does not generally undermine the cosmologists inferences or reliability in other domains, it
shows that evidential systems, and broadly, theoretical apparatuses, are evaluated relative
to, at least, their domains.
One might note that there also appears to be a difference between so-called ‘radical
relativism’ and the sort of relativism which is a consequence of non-factualism, a kind of
moderate relativism. Field rhetorically asks when discussing default reasonable beliefs: “In
virtue of what is it reasonable to use modus ponens on no evidence?” and then concludes
that due to evidential systems being so relative,13 the proper question should be “why value
a methodology that allows the use of modus ponens on no evidence?”14 We may drop the
point about evidence here, for what is relevant to the discussion of relativism is that
whatever beliefs, principles, or evidential system, one wants to argue for, that argument
will be reduced to an argument about epistemic goals and how well that ‘methodology’
does with respect to those goals (here we might think of goals as domains), which may
itself implicate further debates about other meta-goals or tangential goals (and here we
might think of goals as values).
There are two supporting points to make about this—particularly, points which un-
best for their goals, regardless of whether or not they do (and so to avoid assuming anything about their
selection behaviour); but we will see that Field does not take there to be any such oughts.
13There is the additional point that Field takes there to be no straightforward matter of fact regarding
“reasonableness.” There is only reasonable relative to an evidential system, to dispositions, to goals, or to
the evaluated ideal we construct for one another. See: Field (2000), pg. 127-128
14Field (2000), pg. 128
48
dermine the ‘scare’ of relativism: first, that there is actually a general reasonableness and
common ground to goals; and second, that the lack of a principled prohibition on certain
goals does not undermine the actual historical results that evidential systems produce.
Regarding the first, Field argues that one should recognize...
“That certain small modifications would produce results which have certain
advantages (as well as certain disadvantages) over the results [our evaluating
systems] produce. For instance, we recognize that a system slightly more strin-
gent in its requirements for belief is more reliable but less powerful. So we
recognize that a slight modification of our goals... would lead to a preference
for the other system, and we regard the alternative goals as well within the
bounds of acceptability. Consequently we make no very strong claims for the
preferability of our system over the alternative: the alternative is slightly less
good than ours given our precise goals, but slightly better on alternative goals
that are by no means beyond the pale.”15
The idea being that most goals can be seen as decently acceptable—with moderate advan-
tages and disadvantages—and that completely outrageous goals is largely a ‘boogeyman’
problem. However, Field does contest the extreme relativism (still in principle possible)
that might come with one who endorses some very questionable goals but concludes: “so,
what?”16 Indeed, the point of non-factualism is to call for a “goal-relative notion of better”
which would avoid the pitfalls of assuming that there are matters of fact about ‘standards
of correctness,’ and that if there are outliers (like the ‘Moonies,’ those who follow the word
of the Reverend Moon) they aren’t to be dismissed outright ; rather, those outliers who sub-
scribe either to vastly different epistemic goals or methodologies are to be argued against
with moral oughts, instead of epistemic oughts. And all this culminates in the point that:
“We don’t need to believe in metaphysical constraints to believe that [one has] got lousy
goals. (And if calling the goals lousy is evaluative rather than factual, so what?)”17
So, regarding Field’s second supporting claim, if all practices really were equal without
metaphysical constraint, then there would be no problem in so choosing to follow some
15Field (2000), pg. 141
16See, Field (2000), pg. 140-143
17Field (2000), pg. 140-143
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methodology or set of goals;18 but, clearly, this is not the case. Some practices will ‘win out’
over time and“what makes scientific methods better isnt that they say that they will lead
to more truth and less falsehood than these other methods, it is that they do.”19 Maybe
prima facie all evidential systems and goals are permissible, but it would be a mistake
to think that, at least, some of these debates have not made progress over the course of
history, to think that tea leaf reading and science are still equally successful.
In a way, Field is conceding the point: non-factualism is a relativism; but to consider
this a fatal problem would be to forego the ‘point’ of non-factualism’s stress on evidential
systems, on engaging in a methodology—taking up some evidential system and using it in
the world—which will itself reveal its usefulness, or uselessness, over time. Then, Field’s
hope is to say that just because evidential systems are relative to goals doesn’t mean
that the question of, when comparing two evidential systems, ‘which system is better for
a particular set of goals,’ is without an answer. However, if logic is a properly a priori
matter, and so empirically indefeasible, then one may want to question how an otherwise a
posteriori view of the success of evidential systems relates at all to our major concerns—how
do properly a priori concepts get ‘picked’ as a methodology, and how do they ‘succeed,’ i.e.
lead to truths a posteriori? This brings us to the final section where I will discuss Field’s
view on the indispensability of logic to epistemology.
18At least, it is difficult to see how, or why, we might want to privelege one methodology over another
if there is no relevant metaphysical claim or principle to compare them by.
19Field (2000), pg. 139-140
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3.3 Universal Reasoning and Circular Justification
In the first section there were two conceptual obstacles introduced, the first being about the
circumstancial application of some concepts, and the latter being the explanation of ‘what
the inductive methods that would go with [non-classical] logic would be like.’ It is in asking
how, generally, properly a priori concepts might ‘win out’ in their application, as evidential
systems, that these two obstacles meet. If logical principles are an empirically indefeasible
matter, then how is it that we might use them in an evidential system and so empirically
corroborate them? This will introduce three further aspects of Field’s epistemology: (1)
the global use of inductive reasoning across evidential systems; (2) the circular justification
of those concepts used in evidential systems; and (3) the indispensability of deductive
logic. Subsequently, I will attempt to show that non-factualism provides a rule-circular
justification for a priori logical principles insofar as they are invoked in our evidential
systems.
The last section ended with the question: ‘in what sense do we inductively use properly
a priori concepts, concepts we take to be empirically indefeasible?’ Considering the history
of empiricism and debates about the a priori, at least, this would be a reasonable question
to ask; however, Field dumps this divide between a priori and a posteriori concepts when
supposing that we are fundamentally ‘probabilistic believers.’ Over time our confidence in
all of our beliefs is subject to change based on the application of our evidential system at
a particular time and the evidence with which we are confronted. This is not to say that
we are ideal reasoners, or fundamentally ‘Bayesian’ (as so many authors are wont to do),
but rather that all of our epistemic claims can be understood as probabilistic claims, even
those claims that we would otherwise effectively take to be non-probabilistic—i.e. those
claims which Hale might call undoubtable.20 In this way, there is no application of an
evidential system which will not involve inductive ‘updating.’
Before we turn to the question of how deductive logic can neverthless count as indis-
20More particularly, Field has in mind a fundamental conceptual scheme, given by a set of rules according
to probabilistic axioms, which all further epistemic claims are couched in. For further detail, see: Field
(1977). Unfortunately, to cover Field’s “probabilistic semantics” in depth is beyond the scope of the thesis,
but the crucial point, that our semantics for all epistemic claims is probabilistic, is all that is needed to
progress.
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pensible if we are fundamentally probabilistic reasoners, it can now be shown how Field’s
account justifies the conclusions of our evidential systems. This depends upon two ideas:
that evidential systems entitle one to those conclusions which are the consequences of the
system assented to, and that the reasoning behind our choice of evidential systems is rule-
circular. On this first point, Field suggests that “if a person’s evidential system licenses
the person to believe that p under certain conditions, and the person does believe that
p under those conditions, then the person’s belief is quasi-descriptively justified : justified
relative to the person’s own evidential system.”21 The choice of the evidential system,
that ‘methodology’ which will determine what someone ought to believe in certain cir-
cumstances, entitles one to those particular conclusions about certain circumstances which
follow from the reasoning implicated by the deductive principles assumed in the system.
Regarding the second point, however, it is more difficult to see how we might move from
a quasi-descriptive justification to an actual justification. Continuing the above discussion
about science and tasseography, Field says:
“What makes scientific methods better isn’t that they say that they will lead
to more truth and less falsehood than these other methods, it is that they do
lead to more truth and less falsehood than these other methods. In saying
that they do this I am presupposing the methods I accept, but that should go
without saying: that’s what accepting a method involves. Of course, this is
circular. (‘Rule-circular’, anyway).”22
To apply an evidential system is to suppose a set of principles and concepts, logical or
otherwise, which one then reasons according to. This is the “one step” that Boghossian
asks for—to even begin inquiry with an evidential system is to assent to the principles
in question. That said, Field is not entirely convinced by this partial picture he presents,
noting that rule-circular justifications do not seem to be worth much of anything if they can
never turn out false; and this would then seem to be a problem for our logical concepts if
they are the sorts of properly a priori things which could never be false. So, Field concludes,
“rule-circular ’justifications’ of our methods have another role: they serve to explain why
21Field (1996), pg. 362-363
22Field (2000), pg. 139-140
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we value our methods over competing ones.”23 This, however, does not take away from
the justification of any inferential rule for two reasons: one, we have actually provided a
stronger justification, a justification for the whole evidential system which includes that
inferential rule; and two, because one must still assent to the evidential system in question
before being able to be entitled in the first place (there is, in effect, a constitutive part of
one’s ‘accepting’).
So then we might bring all this discussion together to conclude that inductive reasoning
is always justified as it will be employed across all evidential systems. Moreover, it will
always prove to be better than its rivals, from an inductive point of view, and so will
have rule-circular justifications available for its basic principles. At least, Field makes this
point when he says that “our basic system of inductive rules is... ‘immodest:’ it positively
evaluates itself over it’s competitors.”24 What is now needed is a story which explains, in
whatever relation to inductive reasoning, why deductive logic will also be justified.
If deductive logic was necessary to employ our inductive reasoning then the picture
would be quite clear; however, it is not evident that Field takes deduction to be indis-
pensable in this manner. In, at least, “Logic, meaning, and conceptual role,” Field seems
to imply that inductive reasoning is actually prior to deductive reasoning; and that the
semantics for our logical connectives is understood with respect to probabilistic rules and
axioms.25 And so, if it were the case that deductive reasoning is second fiddle to inductive
reasoning, we might have no reason to suppose that deductive logic is indispensable or
ever justified in this rule-circular manner—every evidential system might employ induc-
tive reasoning (since all of our reasoning is in those probabilistic terms), but we need not
suppose that all evidential systems employ deductive logic. However, Field concludes that
it is not the case that “logic is ‘necessary’..., but rather that the epistemological princi-
ples that would do the licensing must themselves employ the logic in question. If logic is
regarded as up for grabs, there is no clear way to apply epistemological principles; there
is no clear fact of the matter as to what they license.”26 Given some set of principles, we
23Field (2000), pg. 140
24Field (2000), pg. 143. Here, Field is also borrowing his terminology from David Lewis; particularly,
Lewis (1971) and Lewis (1974)
25See: Field (1977), particulary pg. 381-383 and pg. 401-402
26Field (1998), pg. 19
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can only answer the question ‘what does this evidential system entitle one to infer,’ if one
can employ deductive logic; and really, one can only assent to some evidential system and
infer certain beliefs or conclusions if they can employ deductive logic.
Exactly what standing this gives deductive logic, however, is still unclear. Earlier it
was mentioned that if one were to ask ‘why is it reasonable to use modus ponens?,’ the
non-factualist would re-frame the question: “why value a methodology that allows the use
of modus ponens?” This suggests that some deductive inferential rule is itself a part of
the evidential system. So, the idea would be that deductive logic is ‘indispensable’ to the
extent that some certain principles, some notion of entailment,27 must be explicitly invoked
in any evidential system one assents to.
For example, there may be some evidential system, I , which entitles one to a set of
particular conclusions, C . But, C would not be determined by those principles in I , unless,
at least, among those principles assumed is a deductive system, D , which will contain a
notion of entailment and a set of logical connectives.
Then, there appears to be two rule-circular justifications. The first is within evidential
systems. Since those evidential systems assume some deductive principles, any conclusions
we draw from those systems we assent to are to be explained in terms of the rules as-
sumed. The second rule-circular justification happens at the more general level of goals
and inductive confidence levels about evidential systems. Here, because our inductions are
immodest, they too rule-circularly explain how we come to have the confidence level and
confidence threshold which determines which evidential system we will prefer.28 There is
27Here I use the language of David Ripley (See, Ripley (2015)) who suggests that we may give differ-
ent semantic readings of the turnstile, which subsequently include meta-logical properties (for example,
transitivity, or distributivity).
28One might wonder how one is supposed to reason inductively given a set of rules derived from proba-
bilistic axioms—especially if we are capable of changing our inductive methods, or in the case that these
methods are not biologically innate (both discussions Field takes up and seems to imply are the case).
Would this not implicate a background and necessary use of deductive reasoning? The application of
whatever axioms of probability is, essentially, application of axioms; and any application of axioms is
fundamentally a deductive logical practice.
So while, the inductive rules are “immodest” and their ever increasing probabiities are rule-circular
justifications, they are derivative of axioms, and to get to that step we will have to apply some deductive
system. This has two potential implications. First, it may be the case that there is actually three rule-
circular justifications: (A) of conclusions from evidential systems; (B) of our selection of evidential systems
by inductive rules; and (C) of those inductive rules derived from our implicit and truly indispensable
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a great deal more discussion that could be had about this, but I will focus on just one
aspect here; namely, that it gives us some way of understanding what the other conceptual
obstacle we began with really was.
The problem with saying we might overturn classical logic for the use of some non-
classical logic, is that it is quite difficult to see what impact these other logics would have
on our inductive methods. If we only accept quantum logic when dealing with quantum
phenomena, but our inductive methods stay the same because our implicit deductive sys-
tem, which gives us those inductive rules, is unchanged; then, we might find very high
success with the evidential system that assumes quantum logic, but this system will not
transfer to other domains. But then, it would seem, that we have not overturned anything
about classical logic, since we are still using it to make our judgments about the evidential
systems. If instead our implicit deductive system were to change to quantum logic however,
then it is difficult to see how we might derive our inductive rules, and so how we might
select evidential systems at all. In effect, the worry then is that distributivity may be
necessary to pick evidential systems (or, at least, measure and compare them inductively),
but note that this will not ever be empirically overturned—the restriction is our conceptual
inability to find good inductive rules from non-distributive deductions.
Then, to summarize Field’s non-factualism...
Logical concepts are properly a priori concepts—they are plausible without
empirical evidence and empirically indefeasible. Our evidential systems license
us to infer according to those logical concepts when they are assumed in the
system so used; however, there does not appear to be any set of evidential sys-
tems which would not employ logical concepts (though, exactly which concepts
may be up for debate and revision according to our epistemic goals). So, logic is
‘indispensable’ (or, ‘necessary’) to our epistemic practices. However, to further
move from simply our entitlement under an evidential system to the justifica-
deductive system. This, however, would return one to a view which, along the lines of Hale, would
indicate a minimal inference kit necessary to doing some derivations of a kind. And, as noted previously,
this is explicitly not the view Field wants to argue for, even though it may be the argument he must make.
However, whether or not the ‘induction only’ approach forwarded in Field’s probabilistic semantics is right
or not, it does not disturb the minimal point made here—that there is a deductive rule-circular argument
for the consequences of our evidential systems.
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tion of our logical conclusions, we must appeal to the rule-circular argument of
those principles. There is no constraint, metaphysically or otherwise, on which
goals we may have (and so which evidential systems we assent to), but our
being inductive reasoners to begin with gives some basis for which we may see
some systems as better or worse.
The next section will return to our three guiding issues: how might non-factualism help
us with Tonk, the type-2 skeptic, or the type-1 skeptic? And, with respect to the lessons
of section 2.4, are we making progress by moving to non-factualism?
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3.4 The Ups and Downs of Non-Factualism
As is now tradition: let’s begin with Tonk. It might immediately seem that non-factualism
raises more concerns about ‘bad connectives’ than it quells. Evidential systems entitle
our logical conclusions according to those logical concepts and principles assumed in the
evidential system; and so, if one assents to an evidential system which involves Tonk,
then they are entitled to their Tonk inferences. Without some further consideration, like
soundness or ‘meaning constitution,’ then any principle can be assumed in the evidential
system, and this is precisely the ‘moderate relativism’ non-factualism results in.
Yet, this line of reasoning is not quite right. One must keep in mind that Field’s
epistemology describes us as fundamentally probabilistic reasoners. Science was explained
as being better than tasseography not because it says it does better (since all evidential
systems do this), but because it does do better; and so, the further implicit point is,
one will recognize that it does better and likely choose to employ ‘science’ (assent to the
relevant ‘science-evidential systems’) over tea leaf reading. This might eventually help us
ward away connectives like Tonk, for they certainly would ‘lose out’ to connectives like
the conditional over time, but note that this does not actually stop one from using Tonk.
Argumentatively, the premise that we are fundamentally inductive reasoners does a fair
bit of ‘heavy lifting’ for Field, but without rules regarding ‘confidence thresholds’ and at
what point one may no longer reasonably assume some principle then Tonk is still on the
table, no matter how badly it performs.
The non-factualist, however, would not mind this conclusion. As we saw earlier,
Field would be happy to call such systems “lousy” and to try and dissuade someone from
employing those logical connectives—certainly this is the thrust behind taking there to be
no fact of the matter about what is reasonable29—but this raises some concerns which I
contest the non-factualist cannot adequately address: particularly, there appears to be a
lack of common ground for which one might try to dissuade someone else, and this answer
29Though expressed implicitly throughout, Field does explicitly say: “Indeed, a main virtue of evalu-
ativism is that it removes the force of most sceptical arguments. Most sceptical arguments depend on
assuming that reasonableness is a factual property of beliefs or of rules, and on the understandable resis-
tance to stripping away the normative nature of reasonableness by identifying it with a natural property
like reliability.” (Field (2000), pg. 143
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appears to undermine the indispensability of deductive logic.
In appealing to our being inductive reasoners, Field does not establish some set of prin-
cipled criteria according to which we may rightfully evaluate someone’s evidential system
as permissible or not; but the hope of the claim is that we can establish common ground
on which we can compare our dispositions about evidential systems: ‘look, this system is
not doing so well empirically, but this other system is. Here is my confidence level about
these assumptions. Is yours the same? What epistemic value do you have that would allow
a lower confidence level?’ Of course, this understanding of common ground raises many
more questions and concerns. I will not attempt to discuss this thoroughly, but instead
raise one particularly troubling response.
While Field’s earlier work attempted to supply an explicit set of probabilistic axioms
that we use, his later essays admit that there can be variety not only with respect to
deductive practices and evidential systems, but also inductive practices.30 Furthermore,
to reiterate a point from earlier, it is not clear what inductive reasoning people actually
employ. The non-factualist creates an idealization of someone when they evaluate their
inferences; and so, it would seem, there is very little common ground at all—one does not
know what actual inductive reasoning someone else is using, and those methods need not
be relevantly similar (besides that they are statistical or probabilistic in some manner)
to anyone else’s.31 The idea that we might compare confidence values, for example, to
30Some form of inductive reasoning is indispensable, this Field consistently holds throughout, but there
is admittance of different inductive ‘rules.’ When discussing the circularity of evidential systems and the
“immodest” nature of inductive rules generally, Field notes: “For instance, the respective users of two
inductive rules A and B that differ only in the value of a ‘caution parameter’ can agree that Rule A is
more reliable but less powerful than Rule B.” (Field (2000), pg. 143) However, the choice here to differ
only by their ‘caution parameter’ is not principled but to continue to make a point about the sorts of
differences Field finds reasonable, i.e. inductive rules A and B can differ drastically.
31For those readers who might doubt the immediate possibility that people fail to reason ideally about
statistics, see: Tversky and Kahneman (1981). In these well-regarded studies, participants consistently fail
to reason appropriately according to basic probabilities (and logical conjunction). I would also forward,
amusingly, this description from Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland :
As she said these words her foot slipped, and in another moment, splash! she was up to her
chin in salt-water. Her first idea was that she had somehow fallen into the sea, ‘and in that
case I can go back by railway,’ she said to herself. (Alice had been to the seaside once in her
life, and had come to the general conclusion that, wherever you go to on the English coast,
you find a number of bathing-machines in the sea, some children digging in the sand with
wooden spades, then a row of lodging-houses, and behind them a railway-station.)Carroll
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show that someone values power and another values reliability depends on the underlying
statistical methods being similar enough in the first place.
Regarding the ‘moderate relativism’ of Tonk, the second issue pointed to was the effect
that this may have on understanding deductive reasoning to be indispensable. Field is very
loose in his characterization of the necessity of deductive inference—recall, we cannot tell
what conclusions one is entitled to given an evidential system without some deductive
reasoning—and minimally all this might call for is some way of ‘reading’ the turnstile
plus a logical connective; but this would have the discomforting consequence that if logic
is indispensable at all, then Tonk is an equal contender to the conditional in principle.
Perhaps the non-factualist would accept this conclusion with open arms—it is, of course,
just a part of moderate relativism and the evaluation of systems—but, with a connective
as dysfunctional as Tonk, it is unclear how one can tell what conclusions are licensed by
an evidential system in the first place. If we use a deductive system that includes Tonk
to make inferences about certain circumstances, our conclusions might be anything at all.
And we have strong reason for believing that such a system will be unlikely to satisfy
any reasonable goals, because it will lead us, whenever we actually infer using the tonk
rules, to believing in entirely unprincipled ways. So, we have a strong case for supposing
that Tonk is going to be part of worse evidential systems, barring really bizarre goals.
What is evident, however, is that the non-factualist lacks the argumentative tools needed
to ‘totally’ stop one from using Tonk.32 What about the type-2 skeptic?
In discussion with the skeptic of logical force, the non-factualist performs excellently:
evidential systems share aspects with both the sort of extreme rule-circular arguments
we saw with Boghossian initially (because they lack a constraint like the rule in question
in being first ‘meaning-constituting’) and the principle of acceptance as understanding
from Hale. One must first assent to the evidential system in question, which then de-
termines what inferences are possible and by what principles; and so to question some
logical conclusion from within an evidential system is to effectively ‘misunderstand’ what
one accepted in the first place. Every evidential system has those rule-circular arguments
(2011), pg. 18
Of course, Alice’s poor inferential behaviour is not itself evidence against the logical structure of thought,
but it does familiarly expose the ease of inductive error.
32I leave it up to the reader to decide if this is a better or worse conclusion than the other views discussed.
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composed of its principles available to it. Before moving on, however, one might recognize
that this is a very different sort of rule-circular justification than those encountered previ-
ously. Particularly, those rules so justified are not justified always, but only with respect
to the evidential system first assented to; and, unlike conceptual roles on Boghossian’s
account, evidential systems do not necessarily provide some semantics or meaning for the
connectives employed.
These features will come back again in chapter four, but it can be said here that there
is a way of employing rule-circular justification which will not depend on some semantics
for the logical connectives beyond their introduction and elimination rules, and which
depends on logical application—one has to first take up some evidential system to employ
in the world for their rule-circular justification—qualities which I will argue are helpful in
answering our three issues. Now we may move on to the type-1 skeptic, noting that Field
does address Carroll’s Tortoise.
Discussion of the type-1 skeptic, unfortunately, has effectively the same features as
the discussion of Tonk (and there is a sense in which the skeptic’s challenge here might be
rephrased: ‘I accept this evidential system with Tonk. Why should I accept your system
with the conditional?’). The non-factualist does not provide any grounds on which to say
that some evidential system must be used or some other other evidential system must
not be used; and so, all that is available to convince the type-1 skeptic is the notion of
‘success’ and any epistemic values they might otherwise have (reliability, power, and so on).
That some system, and so some implicated rule, is successfull and so epistemically useful.
In other words, we attempt to convince them on the basis of the background inductive
reasoning; but, it was shown that little common ground is available when appealing to
inductive reasoning, and one is, in principle, unable to convince the skeptic. Again, Field
does not find this to be a problem, it is simply the consequence of non-factualism.
I propose that there are two fronts on which the non-factualist may attempt to salvage
modus ponens from the skeptic. The first is to argue for it’s being default reasonable,
and the second, which Field acknowledges, is to move to the meta-argument about which
epistemic goals are the right goals to have. Is there any hope for saying that since logic is
a properly a priori concept, that we might be forced to accept modus ponens?
Given that the ‘indispensability’ of logic on Field’s account was so liberally understood,
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it would seem the answer is ‘no.’ Tonk might not be plausible ‘without empirical evidence,’
and modus ponens might, but there are at least three issues with thinking this will resolve
the skeptic’s doubt. First, sometimes Tonk will lead from accepted premises to true con-
clusions. So, even if the connective is not default reasonable, luck might have it that it is
a posteriori reasonable. Of course, this would only last for a short while (since inevitably
Tonk arguments will chalk up more false conclusions than true ones), but nonetheless it is
a possibility—and more importantly, a possibility the non-factualist allows.
Second, evidential systems aren’t constrained to containing only those notions which
are reasonable, or even only a priori concepts. Indeed, evidential systems are so broadly
construed that they contain our inductive reasoning, some deductive reasoning (which
allows us to understand what entailments are licensed in the system), certain premises
or theoretical laws, and presumably some explicit or implicit inclusion of an individual’s
epistemic goals. Consequently, ‘people usually tell the truth’ is as justifed as modus ponens,
insofar as it is assumed in an evidential system one employs; and so, the conditional might
very well be default reasonable while Tonk is not, but it would appear that no one is
forced to assent to the use of modus ponens if they reject the evidential system. And
third, there is a sense in which it is actually quite difficult to say that Tonk is not default
reasonable: certainly, disjunction introduction and conjunction elimination are default-
reasonable. What then is needed is some specification of a quality that these rules have
together that would not be default reasonable, and this a little more difficult to find.33
Field’s strongest line of argument on this front would be to say that Tonk neither
plausibly describes the world without empirical evidence, nor plausibly tells one what
follows from what. So, when discussing the indispensability of deductive logic, we appealed
to the question: “what does this evidential system entitle us to infer?” Though Tonk does,
in the most literal sense, answer this question (one is entitled to any conclusion), one
might contest that this is not ‘default reasonable.’ However, the moderate relativism non-
factualism leads us to would show that this is really an argument about goals—can the
goals which call for the Tonk connective in the evidential system be shown to be bad?
And so, to shift to the meta-argument about goals (‘one ought to accept this epistemic
33Of course, many have attempted to find such an idea. Earlier, for example, we saw Hale forward
the criterion of soundness, but this subsequently raised epistemological issues about undoubtability and
‘rational insight.’
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value’), there may be some route to common ground with the skeptic; at least, Field takes
this to be a possibility: “If it’s a moral ought that’s at issue, fine: I’m not opposing moral
standards on which one ought to aim for the truth.”34 Unfortunately, finding such a moral
force is far beyond this thesis and, arguably, the epistemology of logic. It is difficult, at
least, to see how Tonk or the conditional operator have any quality of morality independent
of our use or further considerations. And if one attempts to find some epistemological ought
to constrain the construction of evidential systems, then Field concludes one has committed
a category mistake, for “on the usual understanding of ‘epistemological oughts’ they govern
beliefs, not goals, and I have no idea what the sort of epistemological ought that governs
goals could amount to.”35 It would seem the skeptic wins again.36
There is one positive thing to take away from this ‘category’ answer though: the idea
that there may be more than one kind of thing in play. Earlier in the chapter it was
mentioned that Field used ‘epistemic goal’ as a type of catch-all for varying parts of our
34Field (2000), pg. 141-142
35Field (2000), pg. 142
36It may be the case that there are other kinds of goals to consider—namely, pragmatic ones—and that
it is too quick to close the book on this issue here. (My thanks to Nick Ray for making this line of reasoning
apparent to me, and with great clarity). Unfortunately, I do not have the space to expand in detail on
this matter, but a few brief remarks might be made. First, the ‘pragmatic ought’ could be formulated so:
“given one’s stated goals, then one ought to choose, or ought not to choose, some evidential system, e.”
Then, the epistemological oughts would govern what one should believe given an evidential system, the
moral oughts would govern what goals one should take to be important, and the pragmatic oughts would
govern what evidential system one picks to match their goals and so, consequently, constrain their beliefs.
Interestingly, this could be read implicitly in Field’s discussion.
The moral ought governing one’s seeking truth might refer to a truth-related goal, but it might also refer
to one’s selection of systems given other goals. We can see, for example, how ‘reliability’ questionably plays
both roles: reliability might be a goal we just have, but it might also be a goal we have when choosing our
system (that our system is reliable for, or relative to, those other goals). Since Field supplies no reason to
believe that reliability is a ‘must-have’ goal, we then might call into question that pragmatic ought which
would select those systems which ‘match’ our goals. It is, of course, seemingly non-sensical to claim certain
goals and then, by some invoked pragmatic ought which does not involve something like reliability, choose
evidential systems which do not get one closer to satisfying those goals; but, Field’s presented dichotomy of
oughts allows exactly this line of reasoning. Furthermore, this raises an interesting explanatory question:
if there was a common pragmatic ought for us to select that system which ‘worked’ for our goals (say,
reliability) and this turned out to always mean selecting systems which involved some particular logical
connectives or concepts—always pick systems with universal quantification and the conditional, say—then
one might wonder what explains the consistent usefulness of those connectives or concepts. There would be
a hint of something ‘miraculous,’ as Eugene Wigner found the applicability of mathematics in the physical
world to be, about those logical concepts implicated (See: Wigner (1990)).
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evidential systems and practice. There, the distinction between epistemic domains and
epistemic values was introduced. Non-factualism of the sort Field presents is incapable
of answering the type-1 skeptic, or barring the use of Tonk, because there is no common
ground on which comparisons may be made for evidential systems, and this can be suc-
cinctly described by the inability to find an epistemic ought which would constrain goals;
however, it is less clear that we might not find an epistemic ought which might constrain
domains or values. In the next chapter, I will present an amended non-factualism based
on this distinction between epistemic goals and the discussions from our previous chapters.
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Chapter 4
Non-Factualism+ : An Amendment
Non-factualism as presented in the last chapter seemed to fall prey to the lack of common
ground; an issue that we also saw Boghossian’s conceptual role semantics face in chapter
one. Boghossian went so far as to name a principle, (UAR),1 and then, surprisingly, reject
it. For conceptual role semantics, it was impossible to ever persuade a type-1 skeptic with
logic. On the other hand, Field attempts to avoid this dramatic conclusion by presenting
the olive branch that epistemic promiscuity does not lead to a growing population of
radical thinkers; and quoting Richard Jeffrey on the matter: “The fact that it is legal to
wear chain mail in city buses has not filled them with clanking multitudes.”2 Were skeptics
everyday commuters this might suffice, but what is called for here is either a great deal
of patience for the diversity of evidential systems (for those which contain Tonk and those
which do not contain modus ponens) or some shared arena by which to compare systems
and make progress; else, Field, like Boghossian, will have to admit the impotence of logical
persuasion. However, while Boghossian was forced to reject (UAR), it is not clear that
the non-factualist is forced to reject the principled possibility of common ground. Field
uses the notion of an epistemic goal to capture the vast majority of concepts, properties,
and principles of evidential systems, but I argue that this misses a distinction between
epistemic domains and epistemic values—a distinction which will carry the potential for
non-universal common ground.
1Recall, UAR: If something is a genuine reason for believing that p, then,... its rationalizing force ought
to be accessible from any epistemic standpoint.
2Jeffrey (1983), pg. 145
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First, to reiterate the distinction: I take epistemic domains to determine the boundaries
of what one wants to know, or know about; and I take epistemic values to determine those
qualities one is interested in their evidential system possessing (again, like reliability or
power). Epistemic values can broadly be described as dispositions one has in their inquiry.
And here we might see that Field’s concerns and points are apt: it is difficult to see
how we might have an ‘epistemological ought’ for dispositions; that to argue about one’s
dispositions is likely a moral ought; that even without some metaphysical constraints we
can still evaluate each other’s dispositions even when these evaluations are idealizations
(though this evaluation will be moral not epistemological); that there is no fact of the
matter about what reasonable dispositions there are to have or not; that every evidential
system will be relative to our dispositions; and so on.
In other words, Field’s attempt to describe ‘epistemic goals’ was really to describe
epistemic values. It is not clear that all of the same things can be said about epistemic
domains. Particularly, I argue that epistemic domains are not relative decisions—they can-
not change from person to person—and that epistemic domains have a different conceptual
relation to epistemic oughts than, at least, epistemic values.
Epistemic oughts, Field notes, would have to determine ‘what one believes’ rather
than (in the case of moral oughts) ‘what one’s goals should be.’ However, one might recall,
evidential systems are defined as “a bunch of rules governing what to believe in what
circumstances.”3 It would seem then, that epistemological oughts are not so inconceivable,
rather they are the evidential systems we adopt. Once adopted we are ‘stuck’ with only
those inferential rules available to the system, entitled only to those conclusions made by
applying those rules, and justified in doing so for as long as the evidential system remains
accepted.
It is imperative to carve out which components are actually necessary to an evidential
system, so that it may be clear what one ought to believe and why.4 Given Field’s de-
scription, an evidential system is seemingly composed of five parts, but I will contest that
only one is actually necessary in any significant sense. Furthermore, there also appears
to be the mistake of assuming that all of these parts are component within the evidential
3Field (1996), pg. 362
4Something Field unfortunately neglected to explicitly do.
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system, rather than being invoked in all situations, but not as a part of the system. So,
an evidential system on Field’s account contains:
1: A method of inductive reasoning
– Bayesian statistics, a set of probabilistic axioms and derived functions, etc.
2: Any related epistemic values
– Simplicity, Reliability, Power, etc.
3: Claims taken for granted
– A set of statements that have a definite truth value (i.e. the laws of physics)
4: A deductive system
– A reading of the turnstile and set of connectives
5: An epistemic domain
– A universe of discourse
All according to the non-factualist: We are fundamentally probabilistic reasoners, so a
method of inductive reasoning will always be necessitated, even if in all cases it is ‘merely’
that method fundamental to us. (Though, note, this does not commit one to a univer-
sal method, only the presence of a method). The deductive system and those claims we
take for granted determine the possible conclusions we are entitled to inferentially; and
without this deductive capacity we could not know what our system licensed. And finally,
epistemic values and the epistemic domain set ‘the agenda:’ what do we want to know
about, and what qualities is one interested in satisfying? However, I will presently at-
tempt to show—considering each item in order—this picture of the evidential system to
be problematic.
First, it does not appear that inductive reasoning is necessarily within the the evidential
system. It might be the case that the circumstances seem to call for some inductive method
to be specified, in which case there certainly will be some inductive reasoning component,
but this need not always be the case. Inductive reasoning is best described, in the spirit
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of Field’s position, as a tool we fundamentally use to make sense of evidential systems
generally. It is how we compare systems—more confidence in this one than that one.
Furthermore, and more importantly, two people can have competing inductive methods
and still make sense of the fact that they are comparing like systems. So, except in
some very special cases, or when attempting to compare results according to the inductive
methods invoked, one is free to choose their preferred inductive reasoning, if any at all,
according to their goals.
Similarly, for the second category of epistemic values, it is a stretch to see these as
principles within an evidential system. When one assents to an evidential system they
are doing so according to their epistemic goals, which we established to be, if not contain,
epistemic values. Two people can have competing epistemic values and still make sense of
the fact that they are comparing like systems.
The third part concerns those propositions we take to be axioms. Here one might
think of ‘the laws of physics.’ Principles of this sort appear to fit better within an evi-
dential system (at least, it is not clear that these axioms are part of our epistemic goals),
they determine what are permissible or impermissible things to deduce in the evidential
system—if one takes for granted that p, then assuming they also employ, say, the law of
non-contradiction, that evidential system would never entitle one to ¬p. Note, however,
neither must one take anything for granted when they assent to an evidential system nor
must they take the same claims for granted as someone else—certainly, ‘the laws of physics’
are not settled. So, it would seem, axiomatic claims are parts that rightfully belong in ev-
idential systems but are not necessary. There may be disagreement between two people
about which claims to take for granted, and yet still compare their systems; one is, again,
free to choose.
The fourth part is something we certainly see as part of the evidential system:5 without
a deductive system we cannot begin to make sense of what our evidential system will
5There is the further discussion, brought up previously, about the difficulty in squaring the derivation
of inductive rules without a deductive system, but this point can again be left to the side. For even if
it were the case that some deductive system was implicit for us globally and ‘necessary’ in this sense, it
does not follow that the deductive systems employed within evidential systems would have to match that
fundamental one we already possess. This would, of course, undermine the whole project laid out and
raise all manner of concerns seen in Chapter 2 about how we come to know those principles involved in
the ‘indispensable kit.’
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determine. But, again, one might note that there can be disagreement here: one is free to
choose which deductive system they prefer. This is precisely what the type-1 skeptic does,
for example.
This leaves the final component: epistemic domains. Understanding these domains as
our universe of discourse should help to make it apparent how they differ from the other
parts. For starters, they do not immediately seem to be contained by evidential systems:
they are neither the circumstances in the world, nor are they a rule we infer by; rather, they
set the boundaries of what an evidential system is about. And here we may now see how
they stand apart from all the other components as well; if two people differ in their universe
of discourse then it is difficult to see how they might compare results at all. Every other
choice may be cashed out in terms of what epistemic goals one has (or more particularly,
epistemic values if we assume the only epistemic goals are values and domains), but if one
changes their universe of discourse then no comparison is possible—the two systems are
being applied to different domains.6 There are inevitably some special cases to such an
idea,7 but if it can be said that at least the epistemic domains of two systems must be the
same for one to compare them, then we can begin to make progress.
So, our evidential systems are not made of five components but instead contain: three
6It is tempting to say ‘applied to different circumstances’ here, but one must be careful to distinguish
between those circumstances which are actual, and which may be captured, or not, by the ‘domain,’ which
is rather the conceptual boundaries one sets up for possible circumstances.
7Particularly, there are three cases I can immediately spot. The first is when the universe of discourse for
one evidential system contains the universe of discourse of the other system, i.e. when one system is more
broad than the other. One might be temped to say that here an epistemic value about reliability or power
would come into play, but this would subsume epistemic domains under epistemic values—would mean
that the epistemic domains as goals depend upon our epistemic values. Instead, since we are attempting
to fix the domains, any evaluations according to our epistemic values should be of the consequences of the
evidential system or our inductive reasoning about the evidential systems but not the domain itself. So, if
one epistemic domain contains another, this means nothing more than if you had two epistemic domains
who had no common elements. Different domains, different systems.
The second and third are the cases where the universe of discourse is ‘full’ and empty. Taking ‘full’
to mean something along the lines of, ‘the universe of discourse which specifies exactly all things to infer
about,’ I can only conclude that the systems involved and so compared would be so radically different, and
that there would be so many to compare, that one would have to concede a ‘not-so moderate relativism’
of the sort faced in chapter three. However, to even begin entertaining this hypothetical brings to the fore
well-trodden paradoxes—for instance, a set of all sets. And in the case of the empty universe of discourse,
I would argue that there is no application at all, and so no comparison to be made. What would it mean
to apply an evidential system to nothing?
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functional parts, one set of principles the system is contingent upon, and a ‘domain of
applicability’. There is the necessary deductive system, and the unnecessary (in that they
may permissibly be ‘empty’ or otherwise non-existent) axioms and inductive reasoning.
Each of these three parts may be changed freely. There is the set of epistemic values, one
of the sets of principles, which are relative to the individual who is selecting the evidential
system. And finally, there is the epistemic domain which specifies exactly what the system
is allowed to be applied to. This make-up of the evidential system will allow us to address
the skeptic, but first the notion of applicability will have to be unpacked, since, evidently,
a lot rides on it.
In the last lesson of section 2.4, it was noted that we should consider the introduction
and elimination rules as a sufficient semantics for the connectives, and that Russell’s asser-
tion and reference distinction might help us understand how assent functions with logical
statements. There are those logical schema which we can reference in abstract but when
we go to assert them in the world we are doing something quite different. Regarding this
difference, Russell says:
“It is plain that, if I may be allowed to use the word assertion in a non-
psychological sense, the proposition ‘p implies q’ asserts an implication, though
it does not assert p or q. The p and the q which enter into this proposition are
not strictly the same as the p or the q which are separate propositions, at least,
if they are true.”8
Russell then advocates for a purely logical notion of ‘therefore,’ which would solve the
subsequent issue of how unasserted propositions can justify asserted propositions (answer,
in effect, Carroll’s Tortoise); but what I would suggest here is that there is an epistemic
(though not necessarily psychological) way of cashing out assertion and reference. When
we take on board an evidential system and a universe of discourse, we are implicitly making
a further claim about the deductive systems we employ; namely, that they apply to the
world—that some p→ q statement actually maps on to those phenomena in the universe of
discourse we are concerned with. Subsequently, when thinking in non-factualist terms, rule-
circular justifications are not for the rule ‘in abstract,’ but for the rule’s application to the
8Russell (2009), §38
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circumstances; and this better explains why the rules we provide rule-circular justification
for ‘are not justified always,’ for they are domain relative. The justifcations are not just
contingent to the evidential systems in a broad sense, but also to the particulars of the
universe of discourse; and these particulars provide feedback in the form of our conlusions
being true or false—our mapping of actual worldly relationships into logical ones being apt
or not.
Now, regarding our guiding issues, we may see how these amendments fare. The type-2
skeptic was handled to begin with, so no further commentary is needed there, but non-
factualism still needs some way of addressing Tonk and the type-1 skeptic. Given that
we know Tonk to be at least principally permissible, I will run the two issues together
in this conclusion for convenience: how do you convince someone who uses Tonk, to use
the conditional? The moderate relativism of Field’s non-factualism meant there was no
non-moralistic argument against one who uses Tonk because there was no common-ground,
no way of appealing to some shared inductive reasoning or, obviously, deductive system,
to show them why using Tonk is a bad idea. However, by fixing the universe of discourse
over time, it is possible to ‘count the truths’ in a straightforward manner. One need not
appeal to inductive confidence values or to epistemic values about power or reliability, for
there is an emergent ratio of true conclusions to untrue concusions for each system. This
has a number of consequences, but here I will note two which I see to be pertinent.
First, as noted in chapter three, if there is no principle behind what the standing of
some evidential system need be for it to be reasonably employed (a particular confidence
level or probability, etc.) then it is diffcult to see how ‘counting the truths’ can help. True
though that may be, there are many ways of understanding what ‘better’ means; and on
this account, once the domain has been fixed, there is the undeniable common ground that
one evidential system has more truths than another (or not), within that domain. Perhaps
that would not stop a skeptic entirely from refusing to switch systems—they may insist on
trying out more and more different evidential systems with the same universe of discourse,
or insisting on a different standard of ‘better’ (a different threshold)—but where we were
entirely lost before, we have now found one footing. Non-factualism is looking to the long
run to show that some evidential system is better. Unless we invoke a new type-3 skeptic,
who will say that truths do not count positively towards an evidential system, then it
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would seem that we have cornered off one of the type-1 skeptic’s escape routes.
Second, one might think that the type-1 skeptic has the potential to retreat to a
different universe of discourse, but this would fail for two reasons. (1) It is precisely by
fixing the universe of discourse that we have the potential for common ground—if we are
to move to another universe of discourse, then fine; Tonk will likely do no better and we
are right back where we started, counting truths in a different domain. (2) If somehow
there was a universe of discourse where Tonk did resoundingly well and the conditional
failed, this would not count against any other system which posits a different universe of
discourse, for there is no sense in which one is now comparing like systems. If such a
myserious domain were found, then the type-1 skeptic would better be understood as the
individual who refuses to assent to Tonk and argues instead for the conditional. In effect,
the position here is not arguing for the conditional directly—though, I take the liberty
of assuming that this argument is an arugment in favour of the conditional—but instead,
for those connectives which ‘fit’ the domain best: quantum logic for quantum phenomena,
classical logical for classical phenomena, and tonk-logic for tonk-phenomena.
Here I have tried to advance the non-factualist approach to answering the logical
skeptics, even if only minimally. I have not eliminated all doubts, but instead limited
those available doubts the skeptics have. Unless one is going to argue that truth has no
bearing on one evidential system being better, then there both is a route to common ground




We began with three simple problems: the nagging bad company of logical connectives
which seem well-specified, but which trivialize our endeavours; the Tortoise who claimed
to agree with our logical concepts but refused to conclude in accordance with them; and
the yet worse skeptic who denied the efficacy of our logical concepts tout court. And
no position considered was capable of answering all three without issue. Here, I have
proposed a modification to non-factualism in the form of a distinction between epistemic
domains and epistemic values, providing common ground on which to address the logical
skeptic. While the amended non-factualist position does not definitively address the issue,
it is largely an epistemically feasible project and the distinction proposed does limit the
argumenative capacities of the skeptic.
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